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State ethics commissions serve as both oversight and enforcement bodies.  
However they are also quasi-judicial institutions whose members are appointed 
by elected officials.  At best this presents problems of oversight, and at worst it 
implies that commissions can be actively influenced by the very individuals they 
are tasked with overseeing.  Previous studies of ethics commissions have 
examined the covariates of creating ethics commissions, or have examined the 
internal functioning of these commissions in the pursuit of their envisioned 
goals.  A largely ignored area of study with regard to these commissions is the 
degree to which elected officials can exercise influence over members they 
appoint and what this says for the effectiveness of these commissions.  In this 
dissertation I examine how elected officials use their appointment authority over 
commissions as a means of political influence.  In turn I examine how this 
influence manifests itself in terms of a commission’s effectiveness.  My findings 
indicate that elected officials do in deed use appointment authority as a means of 
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Chapter One: Ethics Commissions: Background and Issues 
The Purpose of Ethics Commissions 
 
Over the past 50 years, 41 states have created state ethics commissions to 
oversee activities ranging from ensuring that candidates file financial disclosures 
and lobbyists register with the state, to providing ethics training to agency heads 
and investigating ethics complaints.  The popular belief about ethics 
commissions that they provide oversight of public and elected officials.  Indeed a 
whitepaper from the National Council of State Legislatures (Comlossy 2011) 
states, “They [ethics commissions] work to ensure voters’ trust in policymakers 
and political institutions by monitoring compliance with ethics laws and 
ensuring ethical conduct by those under their jurisdiction.” This implies that 
commissions serve as the watch dogs for the public - ensuring that conflicts of 
interest are exposed, financial dealings are done “in the daylight,” that the 
decision-making process is transparent and so on. In practice though, ethics 
commissions are primarily compliance organizations that adjudicate previously 
set standards for what is acceptable, i.e. compliance organizations (Smith 2003a).   
Despite the fact that ethics commissions are mainly compliance 
organizations, getting on the bad side of the ethics commission can still cost 
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public officials, both politically and economically.  Recently Arkansas Lieutenant 
Governor Mark Darr was fined $11, 000 by the Arkansas ethics commission for 
misuse of campaign finances in his 2012 election and the Arkansas Governor 
Mike Beebe has called on Darr to step down. 
Prior to the creation of commissions, states were largely reactive to ethical 
lapses, with state attorney general conducting investigations into ethical failings.  
With the creation of these commissions the stated intent was to have an 
organization that could reinforce public confidence by setting fire alarms for 
ethical failings rather than waiting until they became full-blown scandals. 
Predictably though there is a short life cycle for this sort of attention.  After all, 
commissions are empowered both by well-meaning but imperfect individuals, 
but also by those will likely be overseen by the commission itself (Lewis and 
Gilman 2012; Rosenson 2003).  Additionally, the types of ethics regulations that 
develop out of these events tend to be untargeted, general, and do not 
necessarily address the issue that created the scandal in the first place (see 
Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996; Rosenson 2006). 
A stated end for these commissions resolving issues of ethics and 
accountability was addressing what Lipset and Schneider (1987) refer to as the 
confidence gapi – the erosion of public trust in public institutions (see Bowman 
1990).  According to Lewis and Gilman (2012) the confidence gap began to 
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emerge in the mid-1960s with public disillusion over Vietnam and a generation 
that largely felt overlooked by its political leaders.  The event that broke open the 
flood gates of public distrust though was the Watergate scandal – August 1974.  
As a result of this decline in trust in public institutions states took up the mantle 
of protectors of democracy and began to empower state ethics commissions.   
Although there have been successes, Ethics Commissions have also been 
used as a tool of political attack with policies that have resulted in administrative 
gridlock (see Rosenson 2006; Tolchin and Tolchin 2001).  As noted by Gilman and 
Denhardt (2002), often well-meaning individuals attempt to write empowering 
regulations that “out-ethics” everyone else, thus leading to either administrative 
gridlock, or regulations that address potential charges of quid-pro-quo, but do 
not address more nuanced possibilities for corruption such as lax financial 
disclosure requirements.  These are the sorts of codes that can be Kantian in 
nature and treat taking a pen from the agency stockroom as equivalent to 
embezzlement (Tolchin and Tolchin 2001), but which do not address things as 
simple as requiring elected officials to reveal all of their investments (see 
Rosenson 2003; 2006).  This creates a situation where elected officials create ethics 
commissions that are primarily symbolic in nature.  They serve as a symbol of 
integrity for public distrust but do not really do much in the way of oversight.  
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A good example of ethics policies and ethics commissions being used as 
tools of political attack is South Carolina – a state in which the governor appoints 
all members of the ethics commission.  In 2012 and 2013, South Carolina 
politicians engaged in a political fight using the ethics commission as their 
weapon of choice.  South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley was the target of an 
ethics investigation with charges stemming from the state’s General Assembly.  
The charges came from allegations made by political foes that she lobbied for 
Lexington Hospital (SC) while she was a member of the SC General Assembly, 
and that she did not recuse herself from votes that would have benefitted 
Lexington Hospital.  The commission came to the conclusion that there was 
enough evidence to go forward with a prosecution and then summarily 
dismissed the case without comment.  Following a very public backlash from a 
former political supporter turned foe, the case was reopened and went before the 
commission where Governor Haley was tried and cleared of all charges.  Shortly 
after she was cleared, the ethics commission began investigating potential 
unethical activities of several of her accusers, including the Speaker of the SC 
House of Representatives, Bobby Harrell (Shain 2014).  These political “gotcha” 
games are fairly common and it is not uncommon to use ethics commissions as 
political tools.  As an anonymous state legislator put it, ‘if they can’t get you on 
policy grounds, they will try to get you on ethics’ (Lewis and Gilman 2912: 253).   
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 The public administration literature is replete with discussions and 
analysis of the importance of ethics in the public sector.  Some of these 
discussions are area specific such as finance, personnel, police work, education, 
etc.  Others are more general, i.e. theoretical discussions around the importance 
of ethics and what that means for decision making by public officials (Vigoda-
Gadot 2008; Gueras and Garofalo 2002; Denhardt 1988).  Most of these studies 
emphasize the normative value of ethics such as building ethical capacity in 
agencies and how this leads to more favorable outcomes – what Rohr (1989) 
terms high road ethics.  On the other side of this discussion are the ethics 
commissions which can take on high road or low road (compliance) functions.  
Scholars such as Lewis and Gilman (2012) argue that any discussion of building 
ethical capacity is not useful without first establishing compliance with ethics 
regulations in a meaningful and enforceable manner.  In this manuscript I 
discuss the characteristics of state ethics commissions and the effect politics has 
on the ability of ethics commissions to enforce ethics policies. 
 Despite the stated importance of transparency to the American public 
(Bowman 1991; McDougle 2006) the public knows surprisingly little about the 
actual goings on of state ethics commissions (Smith 2003a).  Both the growing 
influence of special interests at the state level as well as the increase in both 
corruption and the appearance of corruption have prompted calls for greater 
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ethical oversight.  This was noted most recently by the State Integrity 
Investigation (2011) which found that all states fell far short of achieving their 
stated goals with regard to oversight and curbing corruption.  Despite the 
existence of commissions and despite the fact that they tend to have similar 
stated goals, how they go about their achieving their goals and the regulations 
which empower them vary significantly from state to state – see table 1.1.  
Structure and Powers of Commissions 
 Note in table 1.1 that some commissions are labeled as commissions 
proper and others are labeled as boards.  The distinctions are important for 
reasons of enforcement authority and the strength of their decisions.  Boards 
tend to have appointed heads with fixed terms, fulltime staff to oversee their 
activities, and exist as their own budget center.  Many of these have legal backing 
from the judiciary as well meaning that their decisions are binding in court and 
they also possess subpoena powers.  Commissions on the other hand tend to 
exist as line items in the executive or legislative budgets, have terms that set 
renewable, commissioners are not necessarily fulltime, and often require 
approval from a committee of elected officials to pursue charges or investigations 
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X X X X X X X X 
Oklahoma Ethics 
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Wyoming No ethics commission 
Source: National Council of State Legislatures: http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-state-ethics-commissions-
powers-a.aspx 
Note that New Hampshire has an ethics committee made up of elected officials, as do the majority of states; but the focus of 






Note that some states have no commissions.  In these states ethical issues are still 
addressed by the state’s attorney general, or by a standing ethics committee that 
is made up of state legislators.  Western states tend not to have ethics 
commissions, but also tend to have more rural populations.  The lack of 
commissions in these states can largely be explained by history and geography 
so there is likely not anything about being Western (geographically) that makes 
them more prone to not having ethics commissions.  These are states that have 
historically voted Republican and tend to have low populations relative to the 
rest of the country.  However cultural and historical features may play a role.  
This is likely a niche phenomenon since other western states with the same 
traditions do have ethics commissions, e.g. Utah, Montana, Nevada, etc.  The 
point is this geographic phenomenon, while interesting in its own right, likely 
does not provide much in way of generalization about ethics commissions.  
Commission Empowerment and Expectations  
 An important point in the discussion of ethics commissions is their 
empowering regulations.  First, as Mackenzie (2002) and Rosenson (2006) note, 
ethics policies are distinct from other public policies since ethics policies do not 
reflect the true preference of policymakers.  This is because unlike other policies 
such as education policy which target some outside group, ethics policies target 




commissioners, like all bureaucrats, act on the basis of statutory authority (Smith 
2003a).  This includes procedural guidelines such as establishing the bases for 
investigations, subpoena powers, and whether the commission’s findings are 
legally binding.  However, what commissions do may be less important than 
how they do it.  This is a point made by Smith (2003a) in his examination of the 
roles and responsibilities of ethics commissions.   
 Ethics commissions like other organizations tend to model themselves 
after other organizations in their field.  However the expectations of these 
commissions are reflections of social and cultural expectations of the states in 
which they are located (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1994; Anechiarico 2010).  While 
what is considered a corrupt political practice in South Carolina may be seen as 
politics as usual in Massachusetts, the commissions determining what is corrupt 
and what is not tend to have similar underlying organizational structures.  
Commissions all start with the same general structural framework and then 
innovate from there based upon the unique cultural or social expectations of 
their states.   
 Having similar organizational structures but culturally based expectations 
creates cross pressures for defining any measurable standard of integrity to point 
to as successful ethics enforcement.  Having measurable standards of ethicality 




their legitimacy as organizations.  This goes back to the point about overly 
general regulations that have no teeth.  Often a commission’s empowering 
regulations have less to do with whether or not they are proven to reduce 
corruption or increase confidence, and more to do with adding legitimacy to the 
commission.  As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Selznick (1996) note, once 
structural innovation in an organization reaches beyond a certain threshold, the 
organization gains legitimacy by innovating and specializing their structures to 
meet expectations even if such spread does nothing to improve performance.  
Commissions tend not to be empowered to change ethics policies though, and 
ethics policies are debated (by elected officials) less than say education policy or 
insurance policy (Mackenzie 2002).  As Rosenson (2006) claims that the reason for 
this is that unlike other policy types, unlike other policy types ethics policy tends 
to focus on elected officials.  I should note that this structural norm is not only an 
American phenomenon.  Since the 1970s nearly every political jurisdiction in 
OECD countries has created similar public structures to oversee public integrity 
(Anechiarico 2010). 
Ethics Commissions Are Not Desirable To Elected Officials 
 In the United States commissions are empowered as political subdivisions 
of state governments.  However they do not all take on similar structures – some 




the branch’s budget while others are stand-alone agencies with budgets that are 
line items in their state’s budget.  Given the role of commissions though one is 
inclined to ask why political officials would want to empower commissions.  As 
stated above, the creation of commissions is largely responsive and ethics 
policies tend to focus on elected officials.  Political officials do not want to give 
up authority to unelected officials.  As noted by Rosenson (2003) though, they are 
more willing to do so under two conditions: (1) when the creation of a 
commission does not present an economic or political threat; and (2) when the 
cost of doing nothing (and being seen as complacent on corruption) is more 
costly than giving up some authority to a commission. 
 For example, Rosenson (2003; 2005; 2009) demonstrated that legislators are 
more likely to empower commissions when they do not perceive them as a threat 
to their economic and political interests.  Of course her measure is a bit awkward 
since she looks at the salaries of legislators as opposed to their net worth.  Still 
this is an understandable though since access to information on net worth would 
presume strong regulations over things like financial disclosures.  Even under 
her model though, legislators were more likely to pass regulations checking the 
governor than checking themselves.  This raises a variety of questions as to what 
role political power plays in the decisions of these ethics commissions.  While 




role commissions should play, I take the position of Lewis and Gillman (2012) 
that what Rohr (1989) calls low road ethics (compliance with ethical regulations) 
is a necessary antecedent for building ethical capacity.  Therefore any discussion 
of what commissions normatively should do is premised on their achievement of 
low road ethics. 
Reducing the Threat from Commissions: Symbolic Institutions? 
 
The implication from all of this, beyond the argument that elected officials 
seek to control ethics commission, is that commissions may be more symbolic 
than practical.  After all this is ultimately a discussion about accountability – the 
means by which public and elected officials answer citizens for their use of 
power and authority (Lerner and Tetlock 1999).  The idea of public organizations 
as more symbolic than functional is not a new concept.  Edelman (1985: 56) 
argues that administrative agencies serve an “expressive function” and provide a 
sense of legitimacy to the issues they were designed to address.  In the case of 
ethics commissions they express the concept of accountability even though it 
may not readily be provided, i.e. they are symbols.  Smith (2003ab) argues that 
while commissions may be symbolic, they also serve multiple roles including 
policeman and educator.   
In an analysis of ethics complaints filed with the state of Florida, Menzel 




more negatively when found at fault than a filer of a complaint did when the 
target of the complaint was cleared.  This was particularly true for elected 
officials, and a basic understanding campaign politics would dictate why – even 
though one may be cleared of an ethics charge, it still provides ammunition that 
can be used against an elected official in future elections.  After all, the scandal 
may die down but can always be brought back to life once it is on the record. 
Elected officials face the problem of appointed commissioners with the 
ability to censure or otherwise threaten them face an uncertain set of choices 
(McCubbins 1989; White 1985).  One set of choices involves outcomes that can be 
harmful to the elected official (Mitnick 1992).  If this is the case then if one 
assumes that elected officials are rational, or even politically sophisticated, then 
they should seek to mitigate potential threats through their choice of whom they 
appoint and therefore through the amount of influence they have at their 
disposal.  This is essentially a problem of selection.  Elected officials cannot 
perfectly observe the actions of the commissioners, who are primarily political 
appointees.  As such, elected officials seek to mitigate the potential risk posed by 
commissioners by appointing individuals who are friendly to their positions or 
party, are easily influenced, etc. 
The idea of elected officials as having a stake in an ethics commission 




However it also assumes that there is some benefit to be gained from the 
commission’s activities (Stout 2007; Stout and Blair 2001).  One obvious benefit to 
elected officials is avoiding strict oversight.  Another benefit is provided when 
someone is cleared by an ethics commission – e.g. Nikki Haley, or the even more 
preferred option – when the commission fails to take action.  Still other benefits 
can be provided enforcing obvious and blatant ethics violations, such as quid-
pro-quo relationships, but not requiring elected officials to do a full disclosure of 
their finances.  Likewise, an individual may ask the ethics commission to review 
a desired course of action.  If this action is cleared then it can provide cover 
against future charges of unethical behavior and in some states can even provide 
legal cover (Rosenson 2006; Anechiarico 2010).  If one assumes that elected 
officials use their appointment or removal power to influence commissions, it is 
easy to think ethics commissions’ failings as the result of political influence 
rather than of culture or internal organizational pressures.  
Appointment powers give those elected officials with appointment 
powers a great deal of power over the commission; but so does the threat of 
removal.  They may utilize their appointment power, or removal power to make 
life difficult for commissioners who do not side with them.  A good example of 
this is the case of Teddy Lee.  Teddy Lee was appointed by to a five year term by 




1996 and again by Democratic Governor Roy Barnes in 2001 – this time as 
Commissioner.  In 2002 Sonny Perdue (R) won election to the Governor’s office 
and the Republicans took control of the General Assembly.  With staggered 
terms, by 2006 Teddy Lee was the last Democratic appointee left on the 
Commission.  By all accounts, Teddy Lee was not liked by the Georgia political 
establishment.  He went after Democrats and Republicans alike. He fined both 
Vernon Jones (CEO of Dekalb County and Democratic financier) and Republican 
Governor Sonny Perdue for campaign finance violations.  In 2006 a new lobbyist 
oversight law banned campaign fundraising while the General Assembly was in 
session. To help with enforcement the General Assembly gave the commission’s 
budget an additional 68% ($608,000 in 2011 dollars).  Commissioner Lee used 
that additional funding to make financial disclosures available on the General 
Assembly’s website.  Both the GOP led General Assembly and the Republican 
Governor urged him to remove it.  When he refused the commission voted 4-1 to 
remove Lee, prior to the end of his five year term.  They also removed the web 
access to financial disclosures from the General Assembly’s website.  Although 
neither Sonny Perdue nor the GA state legislature directly fired Teddy Lee, his 
firing served their interests.   
A key point about appointment power in this regard is that when this 




have more power over appointees.  This follows Moe and Bendor’s (1985) 
conception of committee and appointment power as a means of bureaucratic 
control.  When we consider this in terms of commissions though, we must ask if 
the ability to exercise this sort of control is a normatively good thing, especially 
considering the stated purpose of commissions.   
This is a sticky question given the stated mission of commissions because 
it envisions a fine line between control of the bureaucracy and potential 
corruption.  Consider this in the abovementioned case of Nikki Haley.  She 
exercised her legitimate authority as the sole appointer and remover for the 
ethics commission; in doing so though she obviously provided a benefit to 
herself.  Moreover she, anecdotally at least, appears to have used that authority 
against political rivals.  In an effort to have the commission find in her favor, the 
Governor publicly announced that she would implicate members of the 
commission in similar dealings if she was found guilty (Smith 2012).  There are 
two points to consider here: first is that the nature of commission activities 
makes them distinct from other bureaucratic organizations; second is that 
because of this political control over these organizations must be thought of 
differently than political control over other organizations.    
 Empowerment is one thing, but no one wants to be the target of an ethics 




damaged.  As a result empowering a commission with oversight authority is 
often just lip service and the commission does not have real authority to target 
those who empowered it.  In many cases legislatures will empower commissions 
with oversight authority, but direct all of that oversight towards the governor.  
The public tends to be ill informed about politics in general so they may never 
know that the legislature created an ethics commission but only empowered it to 
investigate the governor.  As a result they may take the creation of a commission 
as equivalent to oversight.  In the scenario the creation of a commission really 
amounts to nothing more than a symbol of integrity.  As Niemi, Stanley and 
Vogel (1995) note, the governor is already the most visible member of state 
government.  More commissions have oversight of the governor than over the 
legislature (39 for the Governor versus 32 for the legislature).  Of these, only 23 
have oversight over both the governor and the legislature.  Then there are five 
states with separate commissions for the governor and legislature.  However 
from the distribution of oversight authority one can see there tends to be more 
emphasis on the governor than the legislature. This does not mean that 
governors are simply punching bags for the legislature when it comes to ethics.  
Governors also enjoy appointment authority over the ethics commission and in 
many cases the budget of the ethics commission is simply a line item in the 




 The scenarios above paint a picture where commissions are either a tool 
for elected officials to offer a symbol of integrity to the masses.  They are used by 
legislatures to check the governor, and in turn, given appointment powers, or are 
intentionally weakened by the governor.  Of course it is incorrect to assume that 
all commissions are ineffectual or just engage in check box compliance.  The 
power to appoint commissioners differs from state to state as does the control of 
a commission’s budget.  In Connecticut the governor appoints three of nine 
members with the other six appointed by the speaker, president pro tempore, 
and the minority and majority leaders in both houses.  By contrast in South 
Carolina the governor appoints all commissioners and there is no requirement 
for senate confirmation.     
 In all states commissioners generally appointed by political actors with 
varying degrees of checks on who sits on the commission, e.g. some commissions 
are appointed entirely by the governor (South Carolina) whereas others have 
more diffuse appointments involving multiple members of the legislature and 
the executive branch (Washington).  Along with variations in appointment 
authority to ethics commissions, as political entities the make-up of ethics 
commissions varies as do the targets of their regulations.   
 From the outset I claimed, as have others, that commissions may simply 




this political symbolism.  This language has also been used by Smith (2003) in 
describing the roles of commissions.  Symbolism as used by Edelman can mean 
positive or negative.  Positive symbolism would imply that a commission exists 
as an aspirational entity – something which others should strive towards.  
Negative symbolism implies that a commission exists primarily for appearance, 
or as I claim, as a symbol of integrity.  Smith (2003a) as well as his interview 
subjects rejected the negative view of symbolism outright.  Their reason for 
doing this was that the fines and ability of commissions to harm elected officials 
electorally is very real, therefore commissions must necessarily be for more than 
just show.  It is true that commissions can harm elected officials but to claim that 
the ability to harm is the one thing that means commissions are not negative 
symbols ignores the political and institutional realities of commissions. 
 Commissions can harm political officials.  However commissions are 
empowered by elected officials, and typically when it is not painful to do so 
(Rosenson 2003; 2005; 2009).  Additionally, commissioners are appointed by 
elected officials and therefore the appointing officials are likely to maintain some 
form of influence over their appointees.  It is possible then that elected officials 
use this influence to avoid the harm that may be levied by commissions, or to 
direct the harm towards political rivals.  Therefore it does not make a lot of sense 




This is because the ability of commissions to harm elected officials is the very 
reason that elected officials seek to influence commissions.  And, in seeking to 
influence commissions the ability of commissions to carry out their objectives – 
and by doing so to harm elected officials – is dampened.  Therefore a necessary 
condition for claiming that a commission is not-negatively-symbolic is the 
exercise of the ability to harm is exercised despite political influence. 
My Contribution 
As Lewis and Gilman (2012: 195) note, “even the best of codes is not 
substitute for good people.”  The reasons for this seem pretty straightforward 
when we recognize the ability of these commissions to exercise administrative 
discretion.  But this also creates a dilemma that has been hinted at by others but 
never fully explored.  If commissions and agencies are in place to ensure the 
public trust by overseeing elected officials, then how well can they actually 
achieve this when those appointed for this task are appointed by the very people 
they are tasked with overseeing?   
This is the topic that I wish to address in this dissertation.  I explore how, 
and to what degree elected officials wield political influence over ethics 
commissions.  In turn I examine how that influence manifests itself in terms of 
the effectiveness of ethics commissions.  My argument goes that elected officials 




commissioners.  In doing this they can exert political influence over commissions 
to either evade scrutiny of their own activities, or to direct greater attention at 
their rivals.    
I examine the question of if and how political actors influence ethics 
commissions. Using data from the 2011 State Integrity Investigation I examine: 
(1) if and how elected officials exercise their influence over commissions? And (2) 
whether this influence translates into meaningful differences in the enforcement 
of ethics policies? I examine these questions through the lens of bureaucratic 
autonomy, i.e. does the ability of elected officials to control the capacity of a 
commission to act, and the structural independence of a commission affect 
perceived political influence over ethics commission.  This perspective suggests 
that because ethics commissions can be harmful to elected officials, they use their 
appointment authority as a means of influencing commissions.  In my work I 
find mixed support for this perspective with the legislature demonstrating fewer 
attempts at political influence than the governor. 
 In making my argument I examine political influence as a means of 
controlling commissions via resources and structure.  In my arguments I show 
that while traditional notions of controlling the bureaucracy apply to ethics 
commissions, given the capacity of commissions to embarrass or otherwise harm 




and how elected officials seek to limit that autonomy, must be expanded from 
traditional notions.  To do this I argue that the ability of ethics commissions to 
occupy either the role of high road arbiter of ethical capacity, or low road 
regulator of ethical compliance is determined by the political realities used to 
empower ethics commissions. As Lewis and Gilman (2012) claim though, high 
road ethics are not possible without first addressing low road compliance.  I 
examine the capacity of commissions to achieve this low road standard by 
looking at how appointment power over ethics commissions affects political 
influence on commissions.  It is my perspective that elected officials recognize 
that commissions can threaten them both politically and economically, and 
therefore they are not willing to cede too much power to these unelected 
commissions to raise red flags about the behavior of elected officials.  In turn 
though this is a limiting factor for the traditional autonomy literature which 
considers fire alarms as the means by which elected officials monitor the 
bureaucracy.  After all an elected official is not likely to consider an alarm about 
an ethics commission not sounding an alarm on their behavior as a desirable 
means of limiting the commission’s autonomy.  Instead they are likely to rely on 
their ability to control the commission’s capacity and independence as a means 
of controlling the commission’s autonomy.  Thereby they avoid the risk of public 






Chapter Two: The State Integrity Investigation 
About the Investigation 
 
In polls of likely voters respondents tell pollsters that integrity is the 
primary quality they look for in public officials (Fourier and Tompson 2007).  
However many public officials fall short of this ideal and moreover much of the 
public has no clue.  For example in New York Governor Andrew Cuomo 
established the Moreland Commission to investigate corruption in the state 
legislature, however when the investigation began to dig up skeletons in his own 
closet he sought to deter the investigation (Craig, Rashbaum and Kaplan 2014).   
The stated purpose of the State Integrity Investigation (SII) was to identify 
practices in states that reinforce as well as undermine public trust and to then 
rank states on their risks of corruption.  The survey was unprecedented in its 
scope – covering all 50 states with a 330 question survey of experienced political 
reporters.  Seasoned journalists graded each state government on its corruption 
risk using 330 specific questions across 14 categories, including legislative and 
executive accountability, ethics laws, lobbying regulations, and management of 




The Goals of the State Integrity Investigation 
 The State Integrity Investigation has three stated goals: 
 To examine states’ commitment to government integrity and shine 
light on what’s working and what’s not. 
 
 To convince state officials to improve their laws and practices. The 
State Integrity Index highlights “best practices” in state 
government and can serve as a basis for policy reforms that address 
the unique challenges facing each state. 
 
 To inspire the public to become interested and invested in ensuring 
honest, effective state government. The Investigation offers many 
ways for people to become involved – following news about state 
integrity, emailing report cards to officials, sharing experiences 
with state government, proposing solutions, and connecting with 




 The Investigation researched a list of 330 statements about the laws and 
practices that promote open, accountable state government and deter corruption. 
We call these statements Corruption Risk Indicators, and they are organized into 
14 areas of state government oversight. Reporters scored each response on 
ordinal or binomial scales.  Ordinal scales were used for questions of “practice” 
and binomial scales were used for questions of “in law.”  For example: 
• In law, lobbyists are required to file a registration form. (0=No; 1=Yes) 
• In practice, citizens can access lobbying disclosure documents at a 




"In law" indicators provide an objective assessment of whether certain legal 
codes, fundamental rights, government institutions, and regulations exist.  For 
each of the “in law” responses a reporter had to provide the statute(s) which 
backed up their claim. 
 "In practice" indicators address issues such as implementation, enforcement and 
citizen access (State Integrity Investigation 2012). The scoring methodology using 
100, 50, and 0 scores with 25 and 75 deliberately left undefined to serve as in-
between scoring options. In only a few cases, the “in practice” indicators are 
scored with “yes” or “no.”  For a response to be accepted, a reporter had to 
provide at least two published examples to serve as exemplars of the practice 
being effective, implemented, etc.  These included a website link to a relevant 
report, a specific piece of a statute that was not being enforced (or was enforced) 
and examples thereof, or specific state and federal reports addressing the 
questions at hand. Additionally, the reporters were able to include supplemental 
information to support their score.  This helped in vetting responses since the 
“yes, but…” response arose for many of these questions. 
 These questions were broken out into 61 subcategories and 14 categories.  
The ordinal and binomial responses were averaged to create the subcategory 
scores, and the subcategory scores were averaged to create category scores.  In 




While this ranking methodology is flawed beyond the subcategory level because 
error variance increases with each incremental averaging, the only variables I use 
as dependent variables in my subsequent models are individual questions and 
subcategory scores.  As demonstrated in later chapters, these measures and the 
models used to estimate them are reliable and robust. 
Vetting Responses 
The SII researchers worked with the reporters to ensure the validity of responses.  
All initial responses were blindly reviewed by a second reporter from each state.  
These reporters were tasked with identifying the responses as inaccurate, 
inconsistent, or biased.   When discrepancies were identified the researchers at 
Global Integrity and the Center for Public Integrity served as intermediaries 
between the reporters and peer reviewers to resolve questions and come to a 
final agreed upon score. 
Reporters were required to provide multiple references to substantiate 
each of their scores. This could be an interview conducted with a knowledgeable 
individual, a website link to a relevant report, or the name of a specific law or 
institution, depending on the particular indicator. Reporters had the opportunity 
to include additional comments to support their score. Their comments help 
capture the nuances of a particular situation, namely the "Yes, but…" 




Specific Questions from the State Integrity Investigation 
The questions used in this dissertation as dependent variables come 
directly from the SII.  These questions are:  
Table 2.1. Dependent Variable for Chapter Three 
  
In practice, members of the agency or set of agencies 
tasked with enforcing state ethics rules are protected 
from political interference. 
Strongly Agree   8 (19.5%) 
Agree 16 (39.0%) 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 10 (24.4%) 
Disagree  4 (9.6%) 
Strongly Disagree  3 (7.3%) 
 
Table 2.2. Dependent Variables for Chapter Four 
Question m(sd) 
Are the regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch 
(defined here as governors and/or cabinet-level officials) effective? 
48.900 
(17.851) 





 Each of these questions is used to capture a specific concept that I seek to 
model in my subsequent chapters.  For example, the question in table 2.1 is used 
as a proxy for how much autonomy a commission enjoys; and the questions in 
table 2.2 are used as estimates of the effectiveness of specific ethics regulations.  
The use of these measures and the explanatory variables used to model them are 




 Access to State Integrity Investigation data is available at 
http://www.stateintegrity.org/corruption_risk_index_raw_data and questions 



























Chapter Three: Ethics Commissions and Autonomy: How 
Independent are They? 
 
Introduction 
Political influence over ethics commissions is an important topic in 
thinking about the legitimacy of these commissions.  However political influence 
over ethics commissions presents some sticky problems for the current literature 
on bureaucratic autonomy.  No bureaucracy has the authority to make its own 
mandate, but it is important that some have greater autonomy than others. Ethics 
commissions do not usually regulate the providers of public goods or other 
private entities; instead, they target elected and public officials, i.e., those who 
make public policy. Therefore it is desirable that ethics commissions have broad 
mandates; have the authority, funding, and capacity to accomplish those 
mandates; and be able to do so without ex ante or ex post pressure from elected 
officials.  
Commissions are politically empowered institutions that have a 




of commissions to harm elected officials both economically and politically may 
give elected officials an incentive to exert control over ethics commissions. 
Constituencies expect ethics commissions to provide oversight of their 
public and elected officials. A whitepaper of the National Council of State 
Legislatures (Comlossy 2011) states that ethics commissions “…work to ensure 
voters’ trust in policymakers and political institutions by monitoring compliance 
with ethics laws and ensuring ethical conduct by those under their jurisdiction.” 
Commissions serve as watch dogs for the public; they ensure that conflicts of 
interest are exposed, financial dealings are done “in the daylight,” and the 
decision-making process is transparent. In practice, however, ethics commissions 
are primarily compliance organizations that set minimum standards for what is 
acceptable (Smith 2003a).  
Most commissions lack strong mandates, but also can only interpret what 
is ethical according to set rules and guidelines. Ethics commissions and most 
ethics policies have been born of scandals (Rosenson 2003)—the trend of creating 
state ethics commissions can be traced to Watergate. Ethics policies therefore 
tend to be responsive and not reflect the true preferences of electd officials (see 
Mackenzie 2002; Rosenson 2006; Anechiarico 2008). Because of these factors, 




popular notions of corruption, such as quid-pro-quo, while failing to address more 
nuanced indicators of corruption, such as strong financial disclosure 
requirements for elected officials (Rosenson 2006; Tolchin and Tolchin 2001). This 
failure is antithetical to the strong legal mandate that others claim is so important 
for autonomy (Carpenter 2001; Fukuyama 2009).  
Below I address the question of how elected officials seek to influence 
commissions.  I draw primarily on two theories of how bureaucratic autonomy is 
manifested – principal-agent theory and issues of organizational capacity.  This 
manuscript proceeds by addressing the purpose and creation of ethics 
commissions, a discussion of why and how elected officials would seek to 
influence commissions, followed by my hypotheses, model, and findings. 
The Purpose and Creation of Ethics Commissions 
 The majority of ethics commissions have their start with the Watergate 
scandal (Rosenson 2003).  Even today, in states with ethics commissions new 
ethics regulations tend to follow visible and public scandals (Stapenhurst, 2004; 
Rosenson, 2003; and Goodman, Holp and Ludwig, 1996).  After Speaker of the 
House Jim Black was convicted of federal corruption charges in 2007, for 
example, North Carolina passed some of the most restrictive lobbying laws in the 




 Although there have been successes in combatting corruption, ethics 
commissions have also been used as a tool of political attack and have often 
resulted in administrative gridlock. Gilman and Denhardt (2002) note that often 
well-meaning individuals will attempt to write empowering regulations that 
“out-ethics” everyone else, thus leading to either administrative gridlock, or 
regulations that address potential charges of quid-pro-quo, but do not address 
more nuanced possibilities for corruption such as lax financial disclosure 
requirements.  These are the sorts of codes that can be Draconian in nature and 
treat taking a pen from the agency stockroom as equivalent to embezzlement 
(Tolchin and Tolchin 2001), but which do not address things as simple as 
requiring elected officials to reveal all of their investments (see Rosenson 2003; 
2006).  This creates a situation where elected officials create ethics commissions 
that are primarily symbolic in nature.  They serve as a palliative for public 
distrust, but do not really do much in the way of oversight.  
Limiting a Commission’s Autonomy 
 Elected officials face the problem of an appointed ethics commission with 
the ability to censure or otherwise harm them.  Therefore, barring some form of 
control over the commission, elected officials would face an uncertain set of 
outcomes regarding the commission’s ability to harm them politically or 




sophisticated, then they should seek to mitigate potential threats by exerting 
some form of control over the types of actions a commission can take and how it 
can go about enforcing ethics policies.   
The above is a discussion of why elected officials would seek to influence 
commissions, but it does not provide a logic of how.  In considering how elected 
officials influence commissions I attempt to link the literature on ethics 
commissions with the literature on bureaucratic autonomy to develop a theory 
about how and when we would expect commissions to have greater autonomy.  I 
claim that elected officials seek to control the capacity of commissions to act and 
also seek to control the structural independence of commissions.   
Bureaucratic Autonomy and Ethics Commissions 
Autonomy of Ethics Commissions 
A variety of theoretical perspectives have been used to explain 
bureaucratic autonomy.  Fukuyama (2013: 10) conceptualizes bureaucratic 
autonomy as, “the notion that bureaucrats themselves can shape goals and 
define tasks independently of the wishes of the principals.”  Others, including 
Rotberg (2014) consider bureaucratic autonomy as the development and use 
internal capacity and resources without mediation from political institutions.  




the need to examine an agency’s capacity (Hammond and Knott 1996; Whitford 
2005).   
The principal-agent approach tends to focus on the relationships between 
politicians as elected officials and bureaucrats as the implementers of their 
policies.  Within this relationship the principal directs the agent by mandating a 
goal, but at times also mandating how to achieve that goal; for example, 
increasing confidence in political institutions by requiring disclosure of all 
financial interests.  Autonomy from this perspective is then understood as the 
degree to which the agent can direct its own goals or decide on its own methods 
for achieving goals absent direction from the principal.  A completely 
autonomous bureaucracy, under this construct, receives no mandates 
whatsoever while a fully non-autonomous bureaucracy is micromanaged by the 
political principal (Fukuyama 2013).   
The capacity approach addresses how bureaucrats use the variety of 
resources and tools at their disposal to achieve their mandates or implement 
policies.  Capacity is an important prerequisite for autonomy. As Krause 
(2009:18) notes, “even well-intentioned institutions lacking sufficient capacity are 




McCarty (2004) find that even when agencies are equally competent, those with 
less capacity are less autonomous.   
From the previous literature it is easy to claim that ethics commissions are 
often not autonomous (Smith 2003ab; Rosenson 2003; 2006).  In her 2003 work 
Rosenson showed that elected officials are more likely to empower ethics 
commissions when they do not perceive them as a threat to their economic 
wellbeing.  Further, Smith (2003 ab) showed that although ethics commission 
staffs would like to engage in more training, investigation and enforcement 
activities, they are often hamstrung by a lack of financial and staffing resources.  
Rosenson’s (2003; 2006) arguments are based in the belief that elected officials 
have little incentive to provide commissions with a high level of autonomy.  
Smith’s (2003a; 2003b) arguments rest in the belief that for as much as the public 
states they want ethical elected officials (see Bowman 1991), actually enforcing 
ethics or building ethical capacity tend to be primarily symbolic exercises (see 
also Morgan and Reynolds 1997; Tolchin and Tolchin 2001). 
In examining a commission’s autonomy I test several expectations from 
both the principal-agent and capacity approaches.  To test these expectations I 
conceptualize autonomy on an ethics commission as (1) having freedom from 




These are standard conceptualizations of autonomy in much of the literature – 
see Moe (1993), Christensen (2001), Rotberg (2014) and Araral (2009).  Given that 
ethics investigations can be politically damaging to elected officials, and ethics 
convictions even more damaging, elected officials have an incentive to keep a 
commission’s level of autonomy in check1.  Although there is little incentive to 
provide autonomy, some autonomy must be present otherwise the commissions 
would be commissions in name only meaning that the threat from the 
commission would not really exist2.   
To explain how autonomy is manifested I draw on the principal-agent and 
capacity approaches.  From the principal agent approach I examine the ability of 
elected officials to control appointments to a commission and the commission’s 
budget as explanations for a lack of freedom from political interference.  From 
the literature on organizational capacity I consider a commission’s financial 
resources and its staffing resources as explanatory factors for a lack of freedom 
from political interference.     
                                                           
1 On a side note, new ethics standards tend to follow scandal, but these standards tend 
to be reactive, overly general, and poorly written, i.e. they address obvious issues of 
corruption such as quid-pro-quo but tend not to be policies designed to prevent 
corruption such as strong financial disclosure provisions – see Mackenzie (2002) and 
Tolchin and Tolchin (2001). 
2 There is a body of literature from Mackenzie (2002); Rosenson (2006); Bradbury (2007); 
and Tolchin and Tolchin (2001; 2010) which addresses the specifics of how and to what 
ends commissions are empowered, but I do not address these specifics here since my 




Appointment and Budget Independence under Principal-Agent Theory 
A key assumption under principal-agent theory is that one actor (the 
principal) issues directives which are then executed by another set of actors (the 
agent(s)) (Waterman and Meier 1998; Moran and Weingast 1984; Baumgartner 
2010).  Some including Wood and Waterman (1991)3 have argued that a primary 
mechanism for control is appointing administrators who are sympathetic to the 
positions of the elected branch.  It is within these frameworks that I approach 
autonomy within principal-agent theory, i.e. that elected official’s ability to 
appoint the member of the ethics commission affects their ability to wield 
political influence over the commission; and further that a principal’s ability to 
control the agent’s finances also serves as a means of control.  
Appointment Power 
It is hard to imagine that a politician would willingly appoint an 
individual who is antagonistic towards them.  After all, if the ethics commission 
focus is on policymakers, why would the policymakers appoint someone they 
knew would seek to harm them?   Instead it is more logical to assume that the 
more control an elected official has over who sits on the ethics commission, the 
                                                           
3 Wood and Waterman made several arguments about means through which elected officials can 
control the bureaucracy including changing budgets, l gislative signaling, and administrative 




more they will be able to influence that individual.  The literature on the role of 
appointment power and bureaucratic autonomy speaks to this.  For example 
Moe (1985) argues that elected officials seek to make the bureaucracy more 
responsive by increasing the number of administrative positions occupied by 
appointees.  Wilson (1989) also claims that as appointees bureaucratic agents face 
greater pressure to respond favorably to political principals.  Further, Hammond 
and Knott (1996), Snyder and Weingast (2000) and Epstein and O’Halloran4 
(1999) explored political principals’ use of appointments to achieve there desired 
ends and found that the ability to appoint was critical to achieving desired policy 
outcomes under a variety of conditions, including carrying out the policy beyond 
the political life of the appointing authority.  This makes sense when it comes to 
ethics commissions then if one thinks about Rosenson’s (2003) arguments.  
Elected officials may empower commissions when they do not perceive that the 
commission will be a threat.  However institutions change, so rather than a one-
off concern about the threat posed by commissions to immediate wellbeing, 
appointment authority may be seen as a way of ensuring that commissions do 
not become a threat later on.   
                                                           
4 Appointment power was considered important for the bureaucracy although the full study was 
dedicated to the question of “who” gets authority delegated to them (courts, state actors, local 
actors, independent commissions, regulatory agencies) and what level of authority does the 




Of course states vary based on how much appointment authority any 
individual, or set of individuals, has over appointing commissioners.  Therefore 
the ability of elected officials to influence a commissioner, or appoint individuals 
friendly to their position, is likely conditioned on how much authority that 
individual had over the appointment.  Appointment authority can vary based 
upon how many commissioners a single individual can appoint.  For example if 
the governor can appoint three people to a five person commission and the 
President Pro Tempore and Speaker of the House can each appoint one then this 
likely means the governor has more influence over the commission than the 
Speaker or President Pro Tempore.  However appointment authority can also be 
checked procedurally through things like confirmation requirements.  In a case 
where there are no confirmation requirements the appointing individual is likely 
more able to appoint their most preferred person to a commissioner’s post. When 
there are confirmation requirements they may have to temper their position.  
Removal Power  
While appointment of commissioners may ex ante influence, removal 
power represents hard ex post influence.  While it may be difficult to conceive of 
an elected official appointing individuals they knew would harm them, it is 




over the individual can be maintained (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).  
Appointment authority allows an elected official to decrease the odds of the 
commission implementing ethics policies that are harmful to them.  If the 
commissioner were to go native though (Kingdon 1995) then removal power can 
be a hedge to ensure that members of the commission remain friendly or 
otherwise easily influenced.  Canes-Wrone, Howell and Lewis (2008) and Epstein 
and O’Halloran (1999) claim that appointment power is essentially useless 
without the power to remove.   
Like appointment authority the power to remove commissioners varies 
from state-to-state.  Some states allow removal of a commissioner without cause; 
some require that cause be shown but do not define what constitutes cause; still 
others allow removal only for specific violations such as the commission of a 
felony.  Given what is known about removal power and autonomy in the 
traditional bureaus removal power is also likely an important factor in the 
autonomy of ethics commission, again because ethics policies constitute a set of 
policies that elected officials would not subject themselves to if they had their 






Budget Independence  
Even though ethics commissions collect fines, they tend to not be self-
funding organizations.  Additionally, effective enforcement/collection of fines 
presumes that ethics commissions are effective which would in turn presume 
that elected officials are not influencing them.  Rather, ethics commissions are 
funded in one of two ways, either as a flow through of the budget of one of the 
elected branches, or as line items in the state budget.  Given that elected officials 
have no incentive to ensure an autonomous commission (Mackenzie 2002), it 
seems that if they desired to influence the commissions that they could do so 
more easily the more control they have over the commission’s budget.  
According to Behn (2003) elected officials may seek to control budgets 
because budgets reflect an organization’s priorities.  If budgets reflect priorities 
and also affect the ability of a commission to behave autonomously (Carpenter 
2001; Bendor and Moe 1985; Wood 1988) then the ability of a commission to 
request and control its own budget should be an important determinant of that 
autonomy.  The ability to control one’s own budget is important because 
controlling one’s budget allows one to control priorities.  It is likely that this 
ability is of great important on ethics commissions, if one remembers that elected 




autonomy.  Bendor and Moe (1985: 772) have an excellent quote which reflects 
why this is case, “Although bureaus can sometimes move to a paradise of 
exploding budgets and slack, they cannot do so when checked by even a 
primitive form of legislative oversight…”  It seems then that if elected officials 
have desire to influence their ethics commission, then a good way to do it is by 
ensuring that the commissions do not have control over their own budget.   
As an example, in states such as Maryland and Michigan the budget of the 
ethics commission is simply a flow-through from the budget allocated to office of 
the executive.  On Alaska’s Legislative Ethics Commission, the budget is a flow-
through of the budget allocated to paying for legislative staff, expenses, etc.  
Likewise Alaska’s more general Public Offices Commission which covers the 
executive and executive agencies, is a flow-through of the budget allocated to the 
executive. Having the monitored branch responsible for controlling the funds of 
the body doing the monitored seems substantively different than situations 
where the budget of the commission is a line item.  Take for example states like 
Connecticut or Maine where the commission’s budget is a line item for an 






Organizational Capacity and Ethics Commissions 
 Organizational capacity is critical for an organization’s autonomy 
(Yesilkagit 2004; Rotberg 2014; Carpenter 2001).  No doubt organizations with 
more resources are able to exercise more autonomy (e.g. Huber and McCarty 
2004). Smith (2003a) and Morgan and Reynolds (1997) argue that the 
effectiveness of ethics commissions is at least partly dependent upon the capacity 
of staff to carry out mandates including education, filing reports, and developing 
manuals but enforcement and investigation actions may be secondary to these 
activities.  Additionally Smith (2003a) and Herman (1997) both note that more 
effective ethics commissions tend to have greater financial capacity.  Given these 
findings I examine capacity in terms of financial capacity and staffing capacity, 
two areas that are often noted in the literature on organizational capacity, but 
also areas closely related to organizational capacity such as resource dependence. 
Financial Capacity 
It is generally accepted that when agencies have more financial resources 
with which to accomplish their goals then they have greater autonomy (e.g. 
Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Sharfman et al, 1988; Malatesta and Smith 2011).  As it 
pertains to ethics commissions specifically, Herman (1997) and Smith (2003a) 




requirements with limited resources; this in turn may limit their abilities to carry 
out investigations and enforcement actions.  For example, commissions are 
required to create and file documents, create annual reports, engage in 
educational activities, and so on, but also engage in investigations and 
enforcement actions.   
Smith (2003a) examined three state ethics commissions (CT, NY and FL) 
and noted that although the commissions satisfied their mandates for filing and 
accepting forms from elected and public officials, they only had the financial 
resources to conduct serious reviews of 5 – 10% of these forms.  He also found 
that the ethics commissions that were viewed as the most effective were those 
with the most capacity to engage in activities such as investigations or 
substantive review of disclosure forms.  As noted above though, most 
commissions lacked the resources to engage in meaningful reviews or to conduct 
serious investigations.  Both Smith (2003a) and Herman (1997) note that an 
increase in financial capacity would be necessary for the commissions to 
overcome these stresses.   
In examining financial capacity it is necessary to take two things into 
account: first is what the commissions must accomplish, i.e. what is the 




have to accomplish these tasks.  A commission’s tasks include things such as 
developing forms and manuals, compiling annual reports, and of course ethics 
investigations (refer back to table 1.1).   
In a previous review of ethics commission activities Morgan and Reynolds 
(1997) concluded that ethics commissions dedicated much of their financial 
resources to what were ostensibly paper pushing exercises, i.e. creating new 
forms and emphasizing superficial norms of propriety.  A unifying thread 
running through the literature cited above is, given their levels of financing, 
many ethics commissions are forced to trade-off investigations and enforcement 
actions for administrative goals.  Morgan and Reynolds (1997) went further than 
Smith (2003a) in claiming that even meeting those administrative goals was only 
possible a superficial level – certainly not at a level that would imply the 
commissions were acting autonomously.  Additionally, findings from the 2012 
State Integrity Investigation suggest that when it comes to meeting their 
administrative requirements, Morgan and Reynolds’ (1997) harsher 
interpretation was likely correct.  In many states forms were left unfiled, reviews 
of statements of financial interest were years behind and received only cursory 






My concern with staffing capacity is the ability of the day-to-day staff to 
address the commission’s goals.  Specifically I measure the number of staff the 
commission has available relative to the duties that staff must accomplish.  It is 
known that commissions differ widely in how much staff they dedicate to 
achieving their goals.  For example, ethics staff in Connecticut lamented that they 
did not have enough staff to do meaningful ethics trainings, but instead were 
forced to rely on large conferences.  The Florida commission was forced to 
contract out its ethics training because they simply did not have the staff to 
sufficiently meet its mandate (see Smith 2003a).  This is no small matter since 
previous studies have shown that as staffing resources dedicated to combatting 
ethics violations increase so too do corruption convictions (see Mackenzie 2002).  
The stated reason for this is that the staff had more time to dedicate to pursuing 
leads and investigating suspicious or incomplete disclosures.   
In an analysis of different cross-state surveys (Smith 2003a) and a review 
of five years of literature Menzel (2007), results indicate that employees of ethics 
commissions have a desire to pursue the commission’s goals to greater levels 
than the current staffing capacity allows.  Employees noted that they were 




or forms filings while lacking sufficient staff to engage in other activities such as 
training or enforcement. This was true both for administrative activities as well 
as investigations (see Smith 2003a). 
Some have considered the professionalization of a staff as a way of 
explaining autonomy.  Staff size is typically used as one factor in 
professionalization along with other factors such as salary or length of term.  
However previous studies at the state level have shown that with the exception 
of staff size these other factors are not strong explanatory factors for variation of 
ethics enforcement between states (see Goodman, Holp and Ludwig 1997; 
Menzel 2005; Smith 2003a).   
Different bureaucracies have differing degrees of control over the size of 
their staff (see Boyne, Jenkins and Poole 1999).  Ethics commissions do not have a 
great deal of sway over how much staff they have5.  Staffing capacity as a 
function of staff size has generally not been considered when examining 
autonomy with the exception of some of the European literature on the topic.  
For example, Ellinas and Suleiman (2012) found that cabinets with smaller staff 
                                                           
5
 If one reads a state’s codes of law dealing control of staff within the branches, they will 
see that control of the staff within the political branches is a power given to the branch 
itself as opposed to an external body. A Statenet.com (LexisNexis) search of state codes 
dealing with control of legislative and executive staffs, aside from agency staff, reveals that the 
branches (often delegated to the committee or commission level) have authority in determining 





sizes were less autonomous than cabinets with larger staffs – which is similar to 
what I expect here.  Given the literature cited above on how stretched 
commission staffs are it makes sense to examine staffing capacity as a function of 
staff size.   
There is additional empirical justification for this is one considers the 
limits on staffing capacity noted in the failings of many ethics commissions.  For 
example, Delaware’s ethics commission consists of two staff members who are 
responsible for ethics trainings, producing and reviewing forms for all elected 
officials, compiling and annual report and addressing ethics issues for the state’s 
nearly 48,000 public employees (www.stateintegrity.org 2012).  Of course not all 
states are as stressed as Delaware. Wisconsin has a staff of 34, Massachusetts has 
a staff of 24 and Pennsylvania has a staff of 18.  Given the noted stresses that 
many ethics commission staffs are under though, it is more likely that a larger 
staff relative to the commission’s duties will be able to act in a more autonomous 
manner thus leading in a more autonomous commission. 
Data and Analysis 
The theory developed here was tested using data from the State Integrity 
Investigation. In 2011 the State Integrity Investigation, conducted by the Center 




United States. Blinded responses were reviewed by a second political reporter in 
each state, who either affirmed or questioned the initial response. If a response 
was questioned, then both respondents had to provide justification for their 
opinion. All final responses required at least two independent sources of 
verification, such as statutes, journal articles, or other corroboration. While the 
survey’s goal was to rank the states based on their risk of corruption, 26 of the 
survey’s 330 questions asked about the existence and independence of state 
ethics commissions. Additionally, because it was a survey of political reporters, 
the survey population could be expected to closely observe the political activities 
in their states and, as such, findings should be more accurate than surveys of 
average citizens. 
The survey addressed 14 categories, including one that specifically 
addressed ethics enforcement agencies in the state. The questions in this category 
focused on the existence of merit appointments on commissions, auditing of 
commissioner financial disclosures, and such. Respondents were asked if they 
agreed with a statement (Table 3.1) addressing commissions’ freedom from 
political influence:  
In practice, members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics 




Table 3.1 Dependent Variable – Commissions are free from political interference. 
  
In practice, members of the agency or set of agencies 
tasked with enforcing state ethics rules are protected from 
political interference. 
Strongly Agree 8 
Agree 16 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 10 
Disagree 4 
Strongly Disagree 3 
Note: Sum is 41 because 9 states do not have ethics commissions. 
Hypotheses 
To examine the statement above, five hypotheses were tested.  
Financial Capacity: As a commission's financial capacity increases the 
commission’s perceived freedom from political interference will also increase.  
A commission’s budget is related to the number of activities with which it 
is tasked. Commissions with higher task-to-budget ratios should show lower 
levels of effectiveness. Simply measuring the number of activities with which a 
commission is tasked is not sufficient, however, because in addition to specific 
activities, commissions are empowered differently. Some have jurisdiction over 
the legislature and its staff, some over the executive and its staff, some over both, 
and some over all aspects of state government. The National Conference of State 
Legislature (2014) collects data on ethics commission activities, including the 
number of activities in each state. In their datasets, ethics commissions can 




reporting, subpoenaing witnesses, issuing advisory opinions, conducting ethics 
training and developing annual reports (Table 3.2). 















n  44 40 39 49 45 42 32 
  Source: National Council of State Legislatures: http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-
state-chart-state-ethics-commissions-powers-a.asp1 
 
Capacity of Commission Staff: Commissions with larger staff relative to the 
number of issues addressed will be perceived as subject to less political 
interference. 
There are not reliable data on the types of individuals who serve on 
commissions (e.g., lawyers versus educators, etc.), but there is reliable 
information on the number of staff members and the number of activities for 
which a commission staff is responsible (Table 2), providing a measure of 
staffing capacity, i.e., the number of staff per issue handled by the commission. 
As discussed above, if elected officials increase the workload of a commission 
without providing increased budget for staffing, the capacity of a commission to 
accomplish each task is diminished. Therefore, a reduced staff-to-activity ratio 
should be associated with decreases in perceived effectiveness. In addition, as 
stated above, differences in staffing levels relative to budget likely also reflect 
different priorities. However, merely having a large staff does not guarantee the 




than those of educators, they may be more qualified to conduct investigations 
with legal ramifications.  
Structural Independence: As elected officials’ power to appoint commissioners 
becomes more dispersed, the perception of freedom from political interference 
will increase. 
Independence of personnel  
As mentioned above, there can be multiple individuals involved in 
appointing commissioners and multiple layers of confirmation required. 
Additionally, the legislature will naturally have less centralized authority than 
the governor because making appointments from the legislature necessarily 
involves more individuals with appointment authority. For example, in South 
Carolina the governor appoints all commissioners without any checks. In 
Colorado, however, there are five members: one each appointed by the governor, 
the president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house, and the chief 
justice of the state supreme court; those four members select the fifth.  
For this study, a variable was created to measure political control: the 
percentage appointed by a given political body divided by the number of checks 























In Colorado, there are no external checks on an appointee, such as senate 
confirmation or requirements of prior experience. In Wisconsin, however, there 
are six ethics commissioners. All must be former judges (check 1), must be 
nominated by the governor (check 2), and must be approved by both the 
assembly (check 3) and the senate (check 4). The measure for the governor’s 







Thus, the lower the score the less influence any single individual has over the 
appointment of a commissioner. This calculation method is preferable to simply 
using the percentage appointed by, “the legislature” or “the governor,” because 
it captures the degree to which those appointments are the result of greater 
power in the hands of a single individual.  
Finally, recall that not all commissions have oversight over all elected 
branches. Some have oversight over the legislature, some over the governor, and 




have shown that the legislature is more willing to use their appointment 
authority to impose checks on the potential ethical abuses of the governor than 
their own. Similarly, it is unlikely that a governor who is overseen by the 
commission but has high appointment authority would appoint adversarial 
individuals.  
However, the same may be true of the legislature. In fact, some have made 
the case that commissions may be largely symbolic (Smith 2003), partly because 
legislators are able to empower ethics commissions that only oversee the 
governor and not the legislature, and the public is none the wiser. All the public 
is likely to see is that there is an ethics commission, and they assume that the 
commission must be making sure that politicians are acting with integrity.  
Removal Authority: Unilateral removal authority will be associated with a 
decrease in the perception of freedom from political interference. 
There are other means of political influence that may be exerted directly 
on commissioners; chief amongst these is removal authority. Appointment 
power is one tool, but the power to remove is also a potent weapon (see Kingdon 
1995; Lewis 2008). To capture this, the model ranked states based on how much 
control over the removal process was held by a single person, rankling from 
most restrictive to least restrictive: 0 = a commissioner could not be removed; 1 = 




be removed for cause, but cause was not defined; and 3 = he or she could be 
removed without cause. If an appointee could be removed, but only with 
concurrence of another body, the action was coded as a 2, because removal 
required a formal procedure. For example, in Colorado, where an appointee can 
be removed but only with the concurrence of the senate, the value would be 2. In 
South Carolina, however, where the governor has unilateral control over 
appointment and removal, the action would be coded as a 3. 
Independence of Budget: Commissions that control their own budgets will be 
subject to less political interference than commissions whose budgets flow 
through those of elected branches. 
To capture the independence of a commission’s budget, the survey asked 
whether the commission controlled its own budget (1 = yes; 0 = no). Responses 
were coded based on each state’s 2011 budget (the year of the survey), and a text 
search was done for both the ethics commission and the empowering statute of 
the ethics commission.ii If there was no mention of the commission in the state 
budget, budget independence was coded as 0.  
Economic Interests 
When Rosenson (2003) looked at how ethics commissions were created, 
her main hypothesis was that legislators with higher salaries would be less likely 




economic self-interest. However, there are economic interests that are not 
accounted for simply by measuring official salaries of elected officials. They may 
have assets in regulated industries, own large areas of land around areas that a 
state may wish to buy, or be independently wealthy. Of course, access to true 
economic interests presumes strong asset disclosure regulations—something that 
many legislatures have been loath to provide, preferring to regulate quid-pro-quo 
relationships (Tolchin and Tolchin 2001; Rosenson 2006).  
Rather than examining only the compensation from salaries (Rosenson 
2003; 2006; 2009), for the current study, the ratio of legislative salaries to the 
average salary in each state was calculated. From these averages, it could be 
determined whether an individual legislator was incurring a cost by serving in 
the state legislature. A similar measure was used to examine corruption risks in 
national legislatures (Casselli and Morelli 2004). That study showed that poorer 
citizens who ran for office had more incentive to behave honestly in office 
because they could reap more rewards from staying in office. According to 
Casselli and Morelli (2004) this was because their salaries in office were higher 
than their alternatives in the private sector. 
In states with low legislative salaries relative to the average salary in the 




significantly higher than the average salary in their state and would have greater 
financial resources. Therefore the economic consequences of bad behavior are not 
as great as for individuals in states with higher legislative salaries since they 
could more easily absorb the costs of any fines than could the average citizen, 
though there might be political costs. Nevertheless, given Rosenson’s (2003) 
findings about economic incentives it is necessary to control for financial stakes 
on a commission. 
Socio-Economic Variables 
Socio-economic variables have been shown to affect both the creation and 
use of ethics commissions. The current study examined existing ethics 
commissions and measured average taxable income per citizen in each state. 
Rosenson (2003) found that wealthier states were more likely to establish ethics 
commissions because ethics commissions cost tax dollars, and additional tax 
revenues allow wealthier states to create commissions. Other studies (Menzel 
1996; Menzel 2005; Meier and Holbrooke 1992) found that wealthier individuals 
tend to file more ethics complaints. Additionally, income and educational 
attainment are highly correlated (Glaeser and Saks 2006). Therefore, by 
controlling for income, the model also controlled for other socio-economic 




educated people tend to be more politically active. Given findings about income 
and ethics commissions (Rosenson 2003; Menzel 1996; Menzel 2005; Meier and 
Holbrooke 1992), higher levels of income may be associated with higher 
perceived effectiveness of ethics commissions.  
Finally, to account for political differences between states, the study 
measured the percentage of each state’s population that self-identified as 
Democrat or Strong Democrat. Though reporters’ opinions are likely more 
informed than the average citizen’s, theirs are still opinions that rely on selling 
newspapers to readers with political beliefs that are common within each state, 
and their responses may have been colored somewhat by those political 
attitudes. We know that partisanship influences thinking about ethics, given 
findings that Republicans and Democrats have different ideas about what 
constitutes corruption (Redlawsk and McCann 2005). Though both parties 
agreed that corruption constituted criminal behavior, they were diametrically 
opposed over whether favoritism constituted corruption.  
Model Specification 
A partial proportional odds model (see Appendix A for a discussion of 
this type of model) was used to test these hypotheses because of the use of 




around Agree, and Neither Agree nor Disagree, implying that the parallel slopes 
assumption needed for an ordered logit or ordered probit has been violated. An 
ordered probit was run to test this, and the Brant test for proportional odds was 
significant (chi-square = 231.99), indicating that the parallel slopes assumption 
was violated and any coefficients would be biased. Using a partial proportional 
odds model loosens the assumption of parallel slopes and therefore seems to 
make more sense than using an ordered probit or ordered logit. Additionally, 
given the small number of observations, 1,000 bootstrapped resamples were used 
to estimate the model. 
The model specification was tested using a likelihood ratio test between 
the model and a null model, as well as between the model and a larger model, 
using variables that have been previously shown as predictors of corruption 
convictions: educational attainment and religiosity (Glaeser and Saks 2006), 
proximity of population centers to state capitals (Campante and Do 2013), and 
percentage of the state employed in the public sector (Meier and Holbrooke 
1992). The current model performed better than either the null or the more 
saturated model.  
Also note that the partial proportional odds model has certain 




also loosens the proportional odds assumption. Chief among these is that the 
partial proportional odds model allows for the coefficients to be the same or 
different for each category, something that cannot be done in other models such 
as a multinomial logit. This is because the multinomial logit frees all variables, 
when in fact the parallel lines assumption may only be violated by a few of the 
variables (see Appendix A for a description).   
Robustness Checks 
As a check of robustness, I analyzed my data using three separate models 
that included variables that are traditionally considered effective predictors of 
corruption: percentage of population with a college degree or higher (Meier and 
Holbrooke 1992); proximity of state capitals to population centers (Camapante 
and Do 2013); and share of population that attends church regularly (Uslaner 
2004). A full table of these robustness checks is available in Appendix C. 
Additionally, all models included variables to capture competition between the 
branches; for example, if a governor was monitored by the commission and the 
majority share of appointment authority was in the legislature. As indicated by 
the Likelihood Ratio test, the saturated model did not provide a better 
explanation than the more parsimonious model. However, the interactions for 




namely that when a governmental branch has control over appointments and is 
also monitored by a commission, the perception that the commission is free from 
political interference declines.  Note that table 3.3 shows model coefficients while 
table 3.4 show predicted probabilities and table 3.5 shows a correlation matrix of 





Findings and Results 
Table 3.3. Commissions are free from political interference 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
  β 
boot 
σ z sig β 
boot 
σ z sig β 
boot 
σ z sig 
(Intercept):1 0.830 0.563 1.475   4.391 0.681 6.444  *** 2.585 0.786 3.287 ** 
(Intercept):2 -0.119 0.559 -0.213   3.418 0.674 5.068  *** 1.598 0.781 2.046 * 
(Intercept):3 -1.289 0.559 -2.304 *  2.172 0.668 3.252  ** 0.372 0.776 0.479 
 
(Intercept):4 
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Handles    
  
   
  1.379 0.280 4.931 
*** 
Budget per n Monitored 
   
  0.000 0.000 0.736   
   
 
Staff per Issue Handled    
  0.000 0.051 
-
0.009 
  0.108 0.053 2.031 
* 
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Appointment Authority    
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Removal Power    








Independence of Budget 
   
  0.086 0.183 0.469   0.191 0.182 1.047 
 Economic Interests 0.273 0.123 2.222 * 0.298 0.145 2.049 * 0.400 0.132 3.030 ** 






% Dem or Strong Dem 3.243 0.846 3.833 ** 3.456 1.015 3.406 ** 3.062 0.940 3.257 ** 
Z Levels: *1.960 (0.05); **2.576 (0.01); ***3.291(0.001) 
             Residual deviance 135.547 129.769 128.712 
AIC 149.547 155.769 154.712 
BIC 162.348 179.541 178.484 
Log-likelihood -67.774 -64.885 -64.356 
LR test versus Saturated Model     3.382 
DF 177 171 171 
             Model 1: Controls Only; Model 2: Independence of Budget as Budget per # Monitored; Model 3: Independence of 
Budget as Budget per Issue. Note that Model 3 using Budget per Monitored is the preferred model given the lower 
AIC and BIC.  Note that AIC for Model 1 is smallest, but AIC includes a penalty for additional parameters hence the 
distinction to be made is between Model 2 and Model 3.  Note also that the better fit statistics for Model 1 are the 
result of the small sample size – see Hurvich (1989) and Hu (2007).  Model 3 indicates that Budget per Issue is 
significant and in the expected direction H1; Staffing capacity is significant and in the expected direction of H2; 
Independence of Appointees is significant, and in the expected direction of H3; Removal power is significant and in 
the expected direction of H4; and Independence of Budget (H5) is rejected. Standard errors are based on an N=1000 









Table 3.4. Predicted Probabilities | a 1 standard deviation change in &' 
  
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Budget per Issue 0.058 0.084 0.219 0.426 0.213 
Staff per Issue Handled 0.095 0.114 0.234 0.374 0.183 
Legislature's Appointment Authority 0.366 0.242 0.247 0.132 0.013 
Governor's Appointment Authority 0.216 0.208 0.305 0.231 0.04 
Removal Power 0.082 0.108 0.261 0.402 0.147 
Legislature's Economic Interests 0.056 0.077 0.213 0.436 0.218 
Average Taxable Income 0.039 0.056 0.169 0.437 0.299 
% Dem or Strong Dem 0.142 0.164 0.306 0.313 0.075 
Predicted Probabilities  0.091 0.107 0.225 0.376 0.201 
Actual Distribution of Data 0.087 0.109 0.239 0.369 0.196 
      
I use the predicted probabilities given a one standard deviation change in  to interpret the results of my model.  
Given that I am using ordinal responses this seems more appropriate than marginal effects.  Additionally other 
approaches such as odds ratios can be difficult to interpret and are often misleading (see Davies 1998).  I use a one SD 
change instead of min and max because the max and min of the variables for appointment authority range from 0 to 
1 for the Governor and 0 to 0.6 for the Legislature. These can be interpreted relative to the normal predicted 








Table 3.5. Correlation of Independent and Control Variables 
  x 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Legislature's Appointment Authority 1 
        2 Governor's Appointment Authority -0.259 1 
       3 Budget per Issue 0.151 0.164 1 
      4 Removal Power -0.055 -0.213 -0.075 1 
     5 Independence of Budget -0.142 0.229 -0.229 -0.181 1 
    6 Staff per Issue Handled 0.010 0.136 -0.078 0.091 0.308 1 
   7 Average Taxable Income -0.102 -0.065 -0.144 -0.348 -0.150 -0.127 1 
  8 % Dem or Strong Dem -0.094 0.077 0.166 -0.030 -0.012 -0.262 0.260 1 
 9 Legislature's Economic Interests -0.029 0.056 -0.192 0.043 0.062 0.246 -0.053 -0.078 1 
           Note that no item shows a strong correlation with any other item thus indicating that autocorrelation should not be 






Note. Differences are the difference between the perceived freedom from political 
interference under different conditions for who has the most centralized appointment 
authority. For coefficients from this model see Appendix C. 
 
 See Appendix C for a full check of robustness of my model.  As a check of 
robustness I also ran models which included variables that are traditionally 
considered effective predictors of corruption: % of population with a college 
degree of higher (Meier and Holbrooke 1992); proximity of state capitals to 
population centers (Camapante and Do 2013); and share of population that 
attends church regularly (Uslaner 2004).  Additionally I included variables to 
capture competition between the branches, for example if the Governor is 
monitored by the commission and the majority share of appointment authority is 











Legislature is overseen as 
Legislative Authority 
Increases 
0.065 0.162 0.324 0.364 0.084 
Legislature is overseen as 
Gubernatorial Authority 
Increases 
0.028 0.081 0.223 0.479 0.182 
Differences between 
oversight of Legislature 
0.037 0.081 0.101 -0.115 -0.098 
Governor is overseen as 
Gubernatorial Authority 
Increases 
0.227 0.326 0.285 0.141 0.021 
Governor is overseen as 
Legislative Authority 
Increases 
0.108 0.231 0.343 0.267 0.049 
Differences between 
oversight of Governor 




in the Legislature.  As indicated by the Likelihood Ratio test for this saturated 
model, it does not provide a better explanation than the more parsimonious 
model.  However the interactions for political competition do present some 
interesting findings as seen in table 6, namely that when a branch has more 
control over appointments and is also monitored by the commission, the 
perception that the commission is free from political interferences declines. 
General Findings 
The results of my model reflect the fact that current conceptualizations of 
autonomy are not sufficient for explaining autonomy on ethics commissions.  
More broadly this may point to a need to provide additional nuance to 
discussions of autonomy based upon an agency’s proximity to political actors.  
Specifically the ability of elected officials to control the financial and personnel 
capacity of commissions is determinant of a commission’s autonomy, although 
the ability to control the structural independence of the commission appears to 
be the strongest determinant – see table 3.3.   
Given that those making ethics policy are also subject to ethics policy, the 
ability to control the capacity of ethics commissions to act and the independence 
of the commission would seem to be a means elected officials would employ to 
control the ability and/or desire of a commission to take action.  My findings 




specific relationship between elected officials and the bureaucracy.  Although 
this study is confined to ethics commissions, I believe similar findings would 
hold for other agencies with the capacity to directly affect elected officials. 
Findings for Financial Capacity 
 Increases in financial capacity and increases in staffing capacity are both 
associated with increases in the probability of respondents agreeing that ethics 
commissions are free from political interference.  Financial capacity shows a 
stronger effect though.  Increases in a commission’s financial capacity are 
associated with increases in perceived freedom from political interference.  This 
is important for two reasons.  First, it is in keeping with Smith’s (2003ab) claims 
that commissions may be forced to engage in educational and training activities 
at the expense of other, more exploratory, activities.  My model provides 
empirical evidence that this is indeed the case.  Additionally, since the budgets 
for commissions are approved by the legislature, this may be a way the 
legislature keeps the commission “under thumb” so to speak.   The legislature 
can task a commission with a large number of items but not provide a budget 
sufficient to accomplish all of the administrative and high road responsibilities 
and still have a sufficient amount left over for investigations.  
 If the above is the case then it may call into question the legitimacy of a 




on that the public is aware of and it only comes to light when the commission has 
resources to investigate.  Given these limited resources, and in light recent 
evidence from New York and California, serious (criminal) unethical behavior is 
more likely to be discovered in federal investigations. If the legislature can 
ostensibly influence commissions through the budget then the kinds of 
investigations that a commission chooses to conduct will be either glaringly 
obvious violations where a conviction is almost a certainty, or it will be targeted 
against those least able to fight back.  This may explain Smith’s (2003a) 
observation that most ethics investigations target low-level functionaries instead 
of senior executive staff – they are easier targets and lack the resources to mount 
a vigorous defense.   
Findings for Staffing Capacity 
My model also shows that as amount of staff per issue increases, the 
commission’s perceived freedom from political interference increases as well.  
This is expected given the previous literature on bureaucratic autonomy, i.e. the 
ability of bureaucrats to act autonomously increases as they have more capacity 
to address issues.  Additionally, Fukuyama (2009) has shown that elected 
officials often pass multiple, and often confounding, mandates in an effort to 
steer the bureaucracy.  The fact that this variable is significant as an indicator for 




indicates that these respondents view workload as a means of exerting political 
influence.   
This view is bulwarked by the fact that staff per issue was not significant 
in MODEL 2 which used budget per member as the functional form for 
measuring financial capacity; however it was significant in MODEL 3 which 
used budget per issue as the measure of financial capacity.  One may be quick to 
assume that because both the measure for staffing capacity and financial capacity 
use the number of issues as the denominator then they must be correlated –a 
robustness check using only workload as a variable without budget or staffing 
did not perform any better or change the model’s coefficients.  I would argue 
then that because these are both measures weighted by the number of issues that 
they serve as a strong indication that elected officials use workload as a means of 
affecting budgets and controlling financial capacity.  Staffing decisions are 
obviously related to budget, though not directly so, but they are also a function 
of the goals of an organization’s leaders.  Knowing this, staffing per issue likely 
becomes significant in the presence of budget per issue because they are both 
related to elected official’s ability to control commissions.  Financial capacity as 
measured by budget per issue is directly related to the decisions of elected 




of elected officials by way of the goals espoused by those who they appoint to a 
commission’s leadership. 
Increasing workloads serves as an ex ante means of political influence 
similar to other procedures detailed by others such as Cox and McCubbins 
(1987).  Although this variable was significant, the changes as staff per issue 
increase closely tracks to the predicted probabilities of the model generally, i.e. 
there is not a large change in predictions when allowing staff per issue a one 
standard deviation increase with all else constant.  A likely reason for this is that 
staffing decisions are decisions by the commission and may reflect attitudes of 
those who are appointed by elected officials.  Therefore one could consider 
workload to be an attitudinal trait of the commission’s leadership.    
Findings on Structural Independence 
Weaker removal authority and increased independence of personnel both 
increase the probability of respondents agreeing that commissions are free from 
political interference.  The strongest effect of any variable comes from the 
measure for independence of personnel, particularly Increases in legislative 
control over appointments.  As the appointment authority of elected officials 
increases the model closely predicts the distributions that are seen in the data.  




then the results show that political influence is dependent upon which branch is 
monitored and which branch has appointment authority.  When the commission 
has oversight over the legislature but the legislature has a high degree of 
appointment authority, the likelihood of a respondent agreeing or strongly 
agreeing that the commission is free from political interference is lower than 
when the governor has more appointment authority – see table 3.6.  Just as 
important, it is more likely that respondents will strongly disagree or disagree 
that the commission is free from political influence when the monitored branch 
also has more centralized appointment authority.  Note though that the effect is 
stronger for the governor than the legislature. 
 From the above, several findings are available.  Fist the respondents 
recognize the conflict of interest when the branch that is overseen by the 
commission also has the bulk of appointment authority over the commission.  
This seems like an obvious point, but it is one that is not readily considered by 
the public.  Additionally, given that the design of commissions is a conscious 
process; this supports a claim that when commissions were created elected 
officials understood that they could become a threat and so sought means of 
maintaining control over them.  This goes beyond Rosenson’s (2003) findings 
that when elected official’s economic influence is not threatened they are more 




commissions are formed when they are not threatening, but that elected officials 
actively sought to keep them from becoming a threat. 
 Next, in looking at the gubernatorial oversight, it is quite clear that the 
governor’s unitary influence has more impact than the legislature’s more diffuse 
influence.  Additionally, the perceived freedom from political influence is lower 
in general when the governor is overseen versus when the legislature is 
overseen.  It may very well be the case that the governor as a unitary figure can 
exert more influence over the commission that the legislature as a whole.  
However, another potential explanation for this comes from theories from Niemi, 
Stanley and Vogel (1995) and Hale (2013).  The governor tends to be seen as the 
locus of control in state politics and in general tends to receive more credit and 
more blame than he/she is really entitled.  In other words, the governor’s 
position as the figure head and most visible individual in state politics means 
that respondents may believe that he/she has more influence over the 
commission than he/she really does.   
 Finally, as it becomes more difficult to remove a commissioner, perceived 
freedom from political interference increases.  This indicates that elected officials 
use removal, or the threat of removal, as a means of influencing commissioners.  
This is in keeping with previous findings for political control over the 




in place, but the threat of removal is necessary to keep them in line with one’s 
way of thinking (see Kingdon 1995; Lewis 2008).   
Discussion  
Practical Takeaways   
From the study findings, it is possible to compare a commission that is 
free from political influence to one that is not free. This comparison should 
provide a structural example to those who seek to reform or establish such 
institutions. The ethics commission in Wisconsin was perceived by both the 
respondent and reviewer from that state to be largely free from political 
influence. In Wisconsin, the governor has only weak appointment authority, and 
the legislature has none. There are merit requirements for those who can serve as 
commissioner, since they all must be former elected judges (National Conference 
of State Legislatures 2014). Additionally, no commissioner may have partisan 
affiliations or be an officer or employee of any state or local organizations 
associated with political activity. Though all six commissioners are selected by 
the governor, they must be approved by the house and senate (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2014).  
These requirements indicate the high value placed on the independence of 




be former elected judges shows concern for the quality and experience of the 
individuals serving as commissioners. Because of strong merit requirements and 
the fact that no single individual can be appointed because of a political favor, 
the perception of freedom from partisan interference is very high (Table 4). 
If we compare Wisconsin’s commission to one perceived as not free from 
political interference, such as Delaware’s, the differences in institutional design 
are stark. Delaware has loose restrictions concerning who may serve on the 
commission, more a nod to independence than anything more robust. In 
Delaware, the only political restrictions are that an appointee not be an elected 
official or a candidate for public office. However, there are no restrictions against 
having previously been an elected official (29 Del. Laws ch. 58.1 § 5808, available 
at http://delcode.delaware.gov/title29/c058/sc01/index.shtml). All seven members 
are appointed by the governor and require senate confirmation.  
In Delaware, unlike in Wisconsin, there are no set standards of 
competence, only standards describing who may not serve, and loose ones at 
that. Both the Delaware respondent and reviewer disagreed that appointments to 
the Delaware commission were made on the basis of merit. Additionally, they 




A key external factor in designing or reforming ethics commissions is 
ensuring that there are standards of competence that would be difficult for an 
elected official to manipulate. For example, states could require that credentials 
be validated from an external source, such as the state bar association or state 
supreme court, for judges serving as commissioners. Negative standards, such as 
requiring that a commissioner not be an elected official, may provide a guise of 
independence but do not appear to be very effective in preventing political 
interference. Spreading the responsibility for appointment among different 
branches of state government and prohibiting confirmation without external 
validation of merit may decrease the ability of elected officials to influence the 
commission.  
Future Research  
Ethics commissions should be assessed from a functional perspective 
rather than a symbolic perspective. For example, the fines that ethics 
commissions are able to levy are relatively weak compared to the consequences 
of a criminal prosecution. However, it should be acknowledged that 
commissions also do serve a symbolic function, in that they point to an ideal of 
accountability and a standard of what communities will and will not tolerate. 




they are not mutually exclusive. However, meeting the functional requirements 
of an ethics commission must go beyond minimal standards, or it will not 
necessarily satisfy symbolic requirements, for reasons related to the findings of 


























Chapter Four: The Impacts of Political Control on the Effectiveness 
of State Ethics Commissions 
 
Introduction 
In this manuscript I explore the effects of political influence on the 
effectiveness of ethics commission monitoring activities.  Ethics commissions are 
in place to ensure that the public’s business is done “in daylight” and to ensure 
that public officials avoid corruption or even the appearance of corruption.  For 
this reason I examine the effectiveness of ethics commissions in terms of how 
well commissions prevent conflicts of interest amongst elected officials.   Prior 
studies have examined ethics commissions in context of their creation (Rosenson 
2003; 2005; 2009) or in terms of their internal functions, e.g. how they go about 
achieving their missions (see Smith 2003 ab; Lewis and Gilman 2012).  Few if any 
of the existing studies of which I am aware look at the influence of political forces 
on ethics commission activities.  Rather they focus on economic outcomes of 
corruption, on why/how ethics commissions come to be, or on the day-to-day 
functioning of commissions from a public management perspective.  I consider 




factors. My findings indicate that although Governors and state legislatures seek 
to influence ethics commissions through political means, the goals of their 
influence are very different.  
The key external control with which I am concerned is formal political 
influence, i.e. how influence over a commission manifests itself through the 
capacity of elected officials to appoint members of a commission.  As such I 
confine my measures to the effectiveness of monitoring of the legislative and 
executive branches since they have the great authority over appointing 
commissioners.  Specifically I examine the executive’s and legislature’s ability to 
appoint commissioners and the ease with which they may remove 
commissioners. 
The ability to appoint or remove is not the only thing that influences 
commissions though.  Among the other factors that influence commissions is 
institutional capacity – confined here to the capacity of commissions to utilize 
financial resources and the capacity of staffs to achieve goals.  Krause and Woods 
(2012) argue that we should take institutional capacity seriously, but they also 
claim that one must be specific as to the type of relationships we are talking 
about.  For example, theories about Congress and the federal bureaucracy do not 
necessarily translate to useful theories about state legislatures and state 




governments.  Given the dearth of empirical studies of legislative-executive 
relations at the state level in recent years, my study contributes both to the study 
of ethics commissions, and to a smaller degree, to the study of legislative-
executive relationships at the state level.   
This manuscript proceeds with a discussion of ethics commissions and 
their activities, and is followed by a more in depth description of my theory.  I 
then describe the variables used in this manuscript and specify a model for 
testing the alternative theories.  This is followed by findings, conclusions and 
discussion. 
Performance in Context 
Influence and Performance 
Page (2006) presents a model that envisions organizational performance as 
a web in which political and bureaucratic actors utilize different tools to affect 
the performance of an organization.  In his model, legislators influence 
performance through supervision, oversight, and voice.  Influence via 
supervision and oversight is persistent in the organizational performance 
literature dating back to at least Gilbert (1954) and up through Michener (2014).  
Page’s model does not directly consider executive influence, primarily because 
his concerns are agency relationships with congress and with other agencies.  




internal constraints as other organizations, e.g. staff size, budget constraints, etc. 
because of their unique mission they are also distinct from other traditional 
public organizations. 
Commissions are unique since many believe they are independent 
because our notion of what they are – symbols of integrity – suggests that they 
should be so.  Commissioners are appointed by political actors though, and also 
have the responsibility of monitoring political actors.  While commissions may 
be independent in name, the fact that commissioners are appointed by elected 
officials and have budgets controlled by elected officials (the legislature) seems 
to bely the notion that they can be truly independent. 
Legislative and Executive Political Influence 
Political Competition 
External political influence can manifest itself in a variety of ways not all 
of which are mutually exclusive.  It is possible that legislatures use their political 
influence over commissions in an adversarial relationship with the executive 
branch – and vice versa.  It is therefore possible to think of the legislature and 
executive in competition with each other using the ethics commission as a 
weapon in this fight.  If this is the case then commission activities with regard to 
the governor should be more effective when the legislature has more control over 




higher legislative (executive) influence associated with more effective monitoring 
of the executive (legislature) 
Avoidance of Oversight 
A second alternative is that elected officials are not necessarily in 
competition with one another, but utilize their political influence as a way to 
draw attention away from themselves.  This would mean that when there is 
greater political influence from the legislature then there would less perceived 
effectiveness of monitoring over the legislature.  However this by itself would 
say nothing about the perceived influence of the governor – and vice versa.   
Singular Control 
A third alternative is that both of the above scenarios are correct.  This 
process would involve the legislature (executive) drawing attention away from 
itself but focusing attention on the executive (legislature).  This means that 
elected officials use their influence to avoid scrutiny of their own branch while at 
the same time directing scrutiny towards the other branch.  If this is the case then 
the level of perceived political influence from a given branch (legislature or 
executive) should be largely proportional to the perceived effectiveness of 





Ethics commissions in the US largely have their origin in the years just 
following the Watergate scandal (Rosenson 2003).  The popular view of ethics 
commissions is that they reinforce public confidence in both public and political 
institutions.  Specifically, commissions keep political and elected officials honest 
by shining a bright light on their activities.  The argument is that these 
commissions highlight potential violations of ethics laws; shine a bright light on 
conflicts of interest, and allow citizens to verify the integrity of officials and their 
actions.  This logic works if the risk of exposure is greater than the reward of the 
corrupt activity.  Of course this ideal is seldom met.  In reality ethics 
commissions tend to follow a compliance checklist of requirements and 
prohibited behaviors.  Even then, disclosures are left unexamined, conflicts of 
interest are not resolved (or disclosed) and public information may not be 
available (Lewis & Gilman, 2012).   
As examples of the above, the Center for Public Integrity (2012) found that 
since Tennessee established an ethics commission in 2006 it has yet to investigate 
a single claim.  Also, in 2011 North Carolina State Representative Stephen 
LaRoque pushed for loosening of billboard regulations despite the fact that the 




billboard industry6.  There are structural and budgetary arguments for these 
failings.  While structure shapes the formal powers of elected officials over ethics 
commissions, this formal power in turn shapes the effectiveness of the 
commissions and their exercising of oversight power.   
Ethics commissions and their powers are path dependent.  Subsequently 
these commissions tend to take on similar institutional structures and rules.  
They have similar powers because the public has similar expectations about what 
constitutes ethical behavior but not well formed expectations – they are mostly 
symbolic relating to quid-pro-quo and the like.  Given this, arguments about 
public expectation only go so far in explaining why commissions take the actions 
they do, or why some are perceived as more(less) effective than others.  The 
public does not appoint commissioners on an ethics commission; nor do they 
have any role in determining an ethics commission’s oversight powers.  These 
activities are typically the purview of elected officials who empower ethics 
commissions through laws, appoint the commissioners, can remove 
commissioners, and control the commissions’ budgets.  This relationship makes 
elected officials more akin to stakeholders, while the public is typically 
inattentive, absent some focusing event such as a scandal (Rosenson 2003). 
                                                           




Political Control on Commissions 
Ethics commissioners are primarily appointed positions.  Even in the cases 
when a commissioner is not appointed by an elected official they are still selected 
by people who are appointed by elected officials.  For example in Colorado the 
commission has five members, four of whom are appointed and the fifth that is 
selected by those four.  This is as opposed to South Carolina where the governor 
appoints nine commissioners, all without a confirmation process.     
States display variations in how much appointment authority any branch, 
or any single actor has in appointing commissioners.  This appointment 
authority is in turn correlated with variation in an ethics commission’s autonomy 
(see chapter3).  When the legislature has more control over who sits on the 
commission there is a stronger perception of political influence over 
appointments.  This is less true when there is greater influence in the executive 
over who sits on a commission.  Relating this to the literature, this is arguably 
because the executive is seen as the “locus of control” in state government 
(Niemi, Stanley and Vogel 1995; Hale 2013).  As such, the attempts by a single 
unitary individual, i.e. the governor, to attempt to overtly control who sits on the 
ethics commission is more easily traced. Since governors do not want to be seen 





Using data from the 2011 State Integrity Investigation, I previously 
demonstrated that the greater the level of unitary appointment authority for the 
legislature, the lower the perception that the commission could act 
autonomously.  Using this same data I extend this work by providing evidence 
that the level of political control over a commission affects the effectiveness of a 
commission.  Meier and Holbrooke (1992) and Maxwell and Winters (2005) have 
suggested that the existence of regulations such as campaign finance laws have 
no effect on levels of corruption.  Regulations are not always effective or even 
meaningful though, however the independence of the body tasked with 
enforcement may do a great deal to enhance the effectiveness of a regulation.   
Ethics commissions are generally tasked with addressing and 
investigating conflicts of interest and indicators of corruption – failure to register 
as a lobbyist, failure to file financial disclosures, and so on; but this does not 
mean that all commissions do this equally well given that they are not equally 
independent.  For example the events leading New York Senate GOP Majority 
leader Joe Bruno’s indictment were initially uncovered during the federal 
investigation despite the fact that the state’s legislative ethics commission had 





Commissions in a Management Context 
In this manuscript I claim that commissions as organizations are affected 
by both internal and external influences.  Previous studies in organizational 
performance have shown that managers in organizations have ample capacity to 
influence performance (Meier and O’Toole 2001; 2002).  Commissioners act in a 
managerial role on ethics commissions by shaping the patterns of activity on a 
commission and determining how ethics regulations should be implemented.  
However commissions are also beholden to political officials; this in turn limits 
their level of autonomy (see chapter 3).  As an aside this likely truer for ethics 
commissions than other organizations, since a commission has the capacity to 
harm elected officials through fines, exposure, or just being labelled as corrupt. 
 In the previous chapter I demonstrated that when it comes to predicting a 
commission’s level of autonomy, appointment authority appears to have a strong 
effect on political influence over ethics commissions.  The findings suggested that 
there is more perceived political interference and thus less discretion over how to 
influence ethics policy, when the branch that is being overseen also has more 
appointment authority over the commission.  Here I extend this assertion and 




In considering the effects of political influence there are several possible 
paths for how political influence affects a commission’s performance.  These 
paths depend on the motivations of those seeking influence.    
Evading Scrutiny 
First it is possible that elected officials use their appointment authority to 
the commission to gain favors or direct attention away from their own activities.  
Appointees may be friendly to, or easily influenced by, the appointer and will 
use exercise little oversight over the appointer.  This may include pre-clearance 
of specific activities, a lack of investigations, etc.  In any case it should be clear 
that the effectiveness of a commission’s efforts to regulate the executive or the 
legislature should be related to the political influence that body holds over the 
commission.  This is not a new proposition by itself, but an extension of more 
general work on the use of appointment authority to control the bureaucracy, 
e.g. Abney and Lauth (1983), Bowling and Wright (1998), and McCarty (2004).  
If this sort of relationship exists then it should manifest itself in how 
effectively a commission checks a particular branch.  That is if the governor has 
more control over who sits on the commission then the governor has the most 
appointment authority over the commission and there should be less perceived 




the legislature should the legislature have more appointment authority, and 
thereby more influence. 
Political Competition 
We know from Rosenson’s (2003; 2005; 2009) works that the legislature is 
more willing to check the governor than themselves.  Additionally, the different 
branches may see value in going after one another, or may be more prevalent in 
divided government, i.e. the party in the branch with the most appointment 
authority may be unified against another branch.  For example if the legislature 
has more influence over a commission then it may see value both in drawing 
attention away from itself and in directing attention towards the governor.  Such 
relationships have been described as the legislature seeking to use the governor 
as a symbol and the checking of the governor as a signal that they are serious 
about combatting corruption (Smith 2011; Rosenson 2009).  Furthermore such a 
relationship is in keeping with the idea of the governor as the “locus of control” 
in state politics (Niemi, Stanley and Vogel 1995).  The actual power of the 
governor is unimportant in this since governor, as a unitary authority figure, is 
perceived as having more formal authority than is actually the case.   
This type of relationship is about more than using the commission to 
avoid scrutiny.  In this case the commission is used as a tool to go after the other 




relationship.  There is nothing about using the commission to go after the other 
branch that precludes one from directing its attention away from one’s own 
branch – in fact it would seem to be an easier scenario given that commissions 
have limited resources.  From Rosenson’s aforementioned work it seems that this 
is a possibility especially with the legislature.  However it is unclear how well the 
legislature’s activities translate into the effectiveness of a commission, or lack 
thereof, in overseeing a governor.  Furthermore it is unclear how, or even if, 
governors influence commissions as a check on the legislature.  On the one hand 
it is possible that governors would be loath to use their appointment authority to 
influence the commission towards the legislature.  The legislature has more 
checks over the governor than the governor over the legislature so it may not be 
worth the risk.  Knowing the public’s perception of gubernatorial authority 
though, there may be an incentive for the governor to appear tough on curbing 
corruption, and so he/she may empower the commission with more means to go 
after the legislature.  Doing this though would likely also provide a means of 
increasing oversight of his/her own office and so the governor may not wish to 
take this risk. 
Given that commissions have the potential to do harm to elected officials 
both financially and economically (Rosenson 2003), there is a definite incentive 




2005; 2009) demonstrated, elected officials empower commissions when they 
perceive that they will not be a threat.  It makes sense that these same elected 
officials would want to ensure that the commissions do not become a threat in 
the future.  In the previous chapter I demonstrated that elected officials will use 
their appointment authority as a means of political influence over a commission; 
left unanswered is whether this influence matters with regards to a commission’s 
effectiveness. 
Witch Hunts 
There is one final possibility that is most likely the case in the legislature.  
It is possible that, in the legislature specifically, legislators are self-interested and 
use the commission as a tool against political rivals.  Under this relationship 
members of the legislature go after other members of the legislature.   This 
creates a collective action problem where individual legislators are acting based 
on their own interests.  In this case the commission goes after other legislators; 
this in turn prevents the legislature from using its influence to direct attention 
away from itself.   Therefore one would not expect the legislature to act as a 
unitary branch, but rather to act as individuals within a branch. 
Support for this position comes from the literature on legislative 
delegation at the state level, e.g. McGrath (2012); Krause and Woods (2012); Arai 




bureaucracy be able to perceive the preferences of the legislature in order to be 
responsive to legislative influence.  Because there is not normally a single 
appointment from “the legislature” considering legislative influence as a single 
unitary form of influence does not really make sense.  Arguing such would 
assume there is a single voice within the legislature to appoint commissioners, 
speak for the legislature as a whole, and so on.  The reason for this is that while 
“the legislature” as a body may desire to avoid oversight, individual legislators 
may seek to expose rivals – e.g. it reveals the ambiguity of legislative control 
since there are different motivations within the legislature. 
Hypotheses 
From the above I propose four separate hypotheses to test the theories of a 
scrutiny evasion relationship, an inter-branch adversarial relationship (while 
noting that the two are theoretically not mutually exclusive), a relationship 
categorized by using the commission as tools against political rivals: 
Evading Scrutiny: As a branch’s appointment authority over the ethics 
commission increases, the perceived effectiveness of regulations overseeing that 
branch decreases.   
 Under this hypothesis, elected officials seek to influence the commission 
to benefit themselves but do not use the commission as a tool against another 
branch.  Appointment authority serves primarily as a gatekeeping function to the 




screen out individuals who would be outright hostile to them and in turn 
appoint friendly or easily influenced individuals.  Given the above, I expect that 
as a branch’s appointment authority increases the perceived effectiveness of a 
commission monitoring that branch will decrease.  
Inter-branch Adversarial: As a branch’s appointment authority as a means 
increases, the perceived effectiveness of oversight over another branch also 
increases. 
 Under this hypothesis elected officials do not seek direct benefits for 
themselves.  Rather the branch with more appointment power over the 
commission uses the commission as a tool against the other branch.  Again the 
assumed mechanism at work is the gatekeeper function – elected officials 
appoint commissioners who are friendly and/or easily influenced.  However, 
under this hypothesis the goal of appointing these types of individuals is not to 
shield one’s-self but to deflect attention and redirect it at the “other” branch.  
Witch Hunts: As political influence from the legislature increases the perceived 
effectiveness of regulations overseeing the executive also increases.   
 Under this hypothesis members of the legislature specifically seek to use 
the commission as tool against other members of the legislature.  Therefore one 
would expect to see appointment authority positively associated with perceived 
effectiveness because more activity would be getting exposed.  Bear in mind this 
is premised on the notion that effectiveness is equated with exposure rather than 




Resource Dependence: As the capacity of a commission increases, the perceived 
effectiveness of the commission will increase as well.   
 
Given that appointment authority serves primarily a gatekeeping function, it is 
possible for commissioners to be appointed and then “go native.”  Their ability to 
do this though is dependent upon the resources available to them.  Therefore, a 
commission’s capacity (both financial and staffing) will likely be a determinant of 
the commission’s effectiveness. 
Research Design 
Data & Methods 
 In this section I describe the data used in my models.  I begin with the 
dependent variables. These were already described to a degree in the 
introduction but I provide a review here – see table 4.1 for the values of the 
dependent variables.  The data come from the 2011 State Integrity Investigation.  
This survey used 330 questions compiled into 14 categories and 60 subcategories.  
Of the 14 categories, one dealt specifically with the legislature and one dealt 
specifically with the executive.  A subcategory within both the Legislative and 
Executive category addressed the effectiveness of regulations over conflicts of 
interest in each branch – which are a key function of ethics commissions.  One 
subcategory addressed the existence of these regulations, e.g. “Are there 




as governors and/or cabinet-level officials)? While another addressed the 
effectiveness of these regulations, e.g. “Are regulations governing conflicts of 
interest by members of the state legislature effective?”  For a list of the questions 
comprised in each response see Appendix B. 
 Both of these categories were created by averaging the ordinal responses 
of 6 individual questions.  To address the issue of averaging up ordinal 
responses, my initial approach was to conduct a polychoric factor analysis on 
each category.  However the Very Simple Structures criterion indicated severe 
overfactoring, i.e. 7 factors from 12 questions.  Because of this I resort to using an 
aggregate index which is simply the average of the responses from each 
question.  In practice this is just the subcategory score from the surveyiii.  Grice 
(2001) and DiSteffano, Zhu and Mindrilla (2009) both suggest this approach 
when overfactoring is present.  Also, both note that while this approach is not 
ideal, it is fairly standard practice for studies involving factor analysis.  For list of 
the aggregate index scores for each state see table 4.1.  One immediately notices 
that the scores for the executive are on average higher.  This is consistent with 
Rosenson’s (2003) previous findings that elected officials are more likely to 
empower commissions when they perceive that they will not be a threat to them.  
What is at issue is whether there is a systematic difference between the two 




the executive and legislative branches use the same method of influence over an 
ethics commission but for different ends? The prior constraint implied here is 
that ethics commissions have many masters with diffuse influence from the 
legislature, but a unitary master in the governor.  Both sets of masters seek to 
influence the commission, but to what end? Are the ends different for the 
legislature than the executive? 
Table 4.1. Dependent Variables for Models 
  Variables 
State Executive oversight is effective. Legislative oversight is effective 
Alabama 65.000 41.667 
Alaska Gov 50.000 
 Alaska Leg 
 
16.667 
Arkansas 55.000 33.333 
California 60.000 33.333 
Colorado 70.000 33.333 
Connecticut 75.000 41.667 
Delaware 75.000 8.333 
Florida 55.000 29.167 
Georgia 25.000 8.333 
Hawaii 65.000 33.333 
Illinois Gov 55.000 
 Illinois Leg 
 
25.000 
Indiana 45.000 25.000 
Iowa 65.000 41.667 
Kansas 45.000 37.500 
Kentucky Gov 60.000 
 Kentucky Leg 
 
29.167 
Louisiana 60.000 41.667 
Maine 35.000 20.833 
Maryland 30.000 33.333 
Massachusetts 50.000 62.500 
Michigan 55.000 45.833 
Minnesota 35.000 33.333 
Mississippi 25.000 33.333 




  Variables 
State Executive oversight is effective. Legislative oversight is effective 
Montana 60.000 41.667 
Nebraska 45.000 25.000 
Nevada 40.000 25.000 
New Jersey 90.000 45.833 
New York Gov 35.000 
 New York Leg 
 
41.667 
North Carolina 55.000 16.667 
Ohio 40.000 16.667 
Oklahoma 40.000 33.333 
Oregon 35.000 0.000 
Pennsylvania 40.000 16.667 
Rhode Island 60.000 25.000 
South Carolina 25.000 50.000 
Tennessee 60.000 45.833 
Texas 10.000 12.500 
Utah 70.000 20.833 
Washington Gov 60.000 
 Washington Leg 
 
62.500 
West Virginia 50.000 37.500 
Wisconsin 65.000 50.000 
 
Explanatory and Control Variables 
Political Influence 
My key explanatory variable is a commission’s freedom from political 
interference.  To measure this I use a question from the SII, “In practice, members 
of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules are 
protected from political interference.” This response was rated on a five point 
ordinal scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5).  Recall that this 




officials’ appointment power was significantly associated with decreases in 
perceived freedom from political interference.   
Using the direct measure will not provide any indication of how 
appointment authority affects political interference which in turn affects the 
effectiveness of the commission.  This is because the question was general to the 
commission, not specific to any single branch.  To get at branch-specific measures 
I use the estimated effect of appointment authority on freedom from political 
interference as my explanatory variable to measure how appointment authority 
as a means of political influence affects the effectiveness of a commission, i.e. 
()*+,-.|	
	 		0,2.  This is the predicted probability of a 
respondent giving the response that they actually gave given the effect of the 
variable for appointment authority (all other variables are held at their mean).  
There are two reasons for using this approach: (1) I reduce the risk of 
autocorrelation while preserving the intent of the ordering; and (2) I capture the 
effects of appointment authority on perceived freedom from political 
interference.  This is ostensibly a two-stage estimation, however a two-stage least 
squares model cannot be estimated here since the first variable is ordinal and 
there is not agreement on how to treat the error term produced from a first-stage 
ordinal model and the second-stage model is not (Borjas and Sueyoshi 1993).  In 




interference given a branch’s appointment authority. In the second stage model, 
the linear regression, I incorporate these predicted individual probabilities as an 
additional explanatory variable.  Langbein (2012) demonstrates this approach as 
a remedy to problems of selection bias.  I term this variable “Political Influence” 
since it is capturing the effects of Legislature’s and Executive’s chief means of 
wielding power over the commissions.   
In my model I use a variety of controls.  These controls are designed to 
account for both organizational capacity including staffing capacity and financial 
capacity.  I also control for spatial factors that predict state-level corruption and 
the interest in politics from state to state.   
Internal Constraints 
Budgets  
Budgets tend to be blunt instruments in trying to elicit policy change 
(Behn 2003) but a lack of resources may also shape what a commission is capable 
of doing.  Smith (2003a) argues that legislatures use their ability to assign tasks 
(administrative strategy) and control the budget commissions have to 
accomplish those tasks, as a means of weakening commission oversight.  In the 
previous chapter I showed that budget and staffing were significant predictors of 
political influence over a commission.  The functional form of those measures 




measures of financial capacity and staffing capacity that included the proportion 
of the logged budget going towards a given number of activities, and the 
proportion of staff per a given number of activities.  Because my concern here is 
not autonomy but the effectiveness of monitoring specific branches I use 




in order to capture the budget per monitored individual – note that this 
functional form was not shown to be significant in predicting my measure for 
autonomyiv.   
The size of a state is not reflected in the size of its legislature.  For 
example, Georgia has 236 legislators, whereas Minnesota has 201, South Carolina 
has 170 and New York only has 213.  However the size of the commission’s 
budget is tied to the size of the state, hence the log transformation.  Without this 
transformation the data skew more towards more populous states and the mean 
does not provide good representation of all states.   
Staff  
Monetary resources are one constraint on a commission’s effectiveness, 
but another is staffing.  Although budget and staffing are obviously linked they 
are not perfect predictors of one another.  For example a smaller staff with more 
lawyers may cost about as much as a larger staff with more educators.  




activities are taken (Rhodes 1994).  Therefore staff size should be considered as 
another marker of resources available to commissions.  An improved measure 
would be to count the number of lawyers or regulators versus the number of 
educators or administrative staff in a commission.  However reliable staffing 
counts were unavailable. 
In the previous chapter I treated staff size as a function of the budget as a 
predictor of autonomy, i.e. the capacity of staff as a function of the budget 
explained autonomy.  Because I use the predicted probability from the first 
model as an explanatory variable in this model, I use a different functional form 
of staffing for two reasons.  First, to avoid autocorrelation and second, because 
my dependent variable is about avoiding conflicts of interest, as the ratio of staff 
to number monitored increases there are likely more chances for conflicts of 




Commission structure may have an impact on how much an elected 
official can exert political influence.  For example, agencies that are established in 
statute and have appointed agency heads may have more cover from political 
influence than commissions that exist as a subsidiary of an elected branch.  
Commissions are “independent” bodies established under an elected branch – so 
a commission may have the legal distinction of being a part of the executive or 




exercise more independence from legislative or executive control.  As such these 
distinctions may be important in how much influence can manifest itself.  To 
capture these distinctions I use a dichotomous measure based upon whether the 
body in question is an agency established in statute with a line-item in the state 
budget, or if it is a commission with a budget that is a flow-through from a 
political branch (1 if an agency, 0 if a commission). 
Regulations Exist  
Because I am using a dependent variable which asks about the 
effectiveness of regulations, I include a control for whether or not regulations 
exist.  Obviously if the regulations do not exist then counting them as being 
ineffective would bias the results. Because my dependent variable is an 
aggregate of questions about the effectiveness of regulations, this variable is an 
aggregate of the questions for the existence of those regulations.  It could be the 
case that a particularly strong commission exposes misdeeds as a matter of 
practice rather than being empowered by regulations.  That is, one commission 
may only investigate when some compliance or filing standard has not been met; 
while others may be more proactive in their investigations.  In addition to these 
concerns, Rosenson (2003) showed that the legislature is more likely to pass 
regulations overseeing the executive than the legislature.  After all some 




regulate the executive while other commissions have the authority to regulate 
both the executive and the legislature.  As such, the measure controlling for the 
existence of regulations is necessary for comparing the results between the 
legislature and executive. 
State Level Controls 
One obvious issue when using surveys that ask about things like conflicts 
of interest is that the definition of what constitutes a conflict of interest may 
differ from state-to-state.  What is considered a conflict of interest in South 
Carolina may be considered standard procedure in New Jersey.  To account for 
this difference in views I use state level variables designed to capture some 
(obviously not all) political and value differences between states. 
Controls are drawn from the 2011 update to the 2010 census.  I use the 
2011 update because the SII was conducted in 2011.  These include the 
percentage identifying as Democrats or Strong Democrats as a control for 
partisan make-up and a spatial measure for the distance of the state capitol to 
major population centers.   
Partisanship 
To measure partisanship I use the percentage identifying as democrats or 
strong democrats.  Redlawsk and McCann (2005) found that Republicans and 




was significantly different from one another on whether or not corruption 
constituted criminal behavior.  However the parties were diametrically opposed 
(reversed signs) when it came to whether or not favoritism constituted 
corruption.  Therefore partisan differences may shape what is viewed as a 
conflict of interest. 
Spatial Controls 
Finally spatial factors may be associated with different responses, especially 
since the respondents are reporters.  Having more population in closer proximity 
to centers of government means that there is a larger media market for stories 
concerning the government (Campante and Do 2013).  Therefore respondents in 
states with more population in greater proximity to state capitals are likely to be 
more sensitive to conflicts of interest since their share of the market for 
government stories is larger.  Standard spatial indices such as the Herfindhal 
index only capture concentration over a uniform space as opposed to around 
multiple points, such as state capitals.  To account for this I use a gravity 
centered spatial index to measure the proximity of state populations to state 
capitals – see Campante and Do (2013).  This variable is a measure of the spatial 







I model the relationship described above using an OLS regression.  The Bruesch-
Pagan test showed that multicollinearity was not a problem and the RESET tests 
indicate that the models are specified.  Obviously with 50 states, even with dual 
verification requirements and two responses per state, a small N is an issue for 
modeling considerations.  To address the small N I rely on a standard 1,000 
bootstrapped samples to estimate the standard errors – see Buchinsky (1995) and 






Findings and Discussion 
 
Table 4.2. Predicting the Effectiveness of Regulations Overseeing the Governor 
  Model 1: Influence from Governor Model 2: Influence from Legislature 
  β σ boot σ t sig β σ boot σ t sig 
(Intercept) 51.214 19.860 22.635 2.263 ** 53.448 19.860 25.081 2.131 * 
Governor's Influence -7.756 10.801 3.86 -1.963  * 
     Legislature's Influence 
    
  6.506 12.360 4.169 1.561 
 Budget per Member 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.099 
 Staff per Member -3.906 2.534 2.434 -1.605   -4.089 2.534 2.456 -1.665 
 Regulations Exist for Governor 0.273 0.133 0.127 2.156 * 0.274 0.133 0.126 2.182 * 
Fulltime Commission 11.001 5.123 4.461 2.466 * 10.956 5.123 4.504 2.432 * 
% Dem or Strong Dem -44.492 29.870 36.389 -1.223   -47.700 29.870 40.271 -1.184 
 Spatial Factor -5.552 23.100 27.618 -0.201   -7.029 23.100 28.870 -0.243  
           t-levels: *1.960 (0.05); **2.576 (0.01); ***3.291(0.001) 
           R Sq 0.387 0.373 
Adj R Sq 0.274 0.269 
F 3.422 on 7 and 38 degrees of freedom, p=.006 3.157 on 7 and 38 degrees of freedom 
RESET 0.773, p=0.469 0.444, p=0.645 
Breusch-Pagan 4.309, p=0.744 3.443, p=0.841 
           In both models the effectiveness of monitoring the governor increases with appointment authority.  This likely indicates that 
the governor as a unitary actor cannot exercise his appointment powers to his own ends, but the legislature uses their power 






alternative models and robustness checks.  
           Table 4.3. Predicting the Effectiveness of Regulations Overseeing the Legislature 
  Model 3: Influence from Governor Model 4: Influence from Legislature 
  β σ boot σ t sig β σ boot σ t sig 
(Intercept) -15.496 17.720 22.187 -0.698   -0.330 17.720 -0.680 0.486 
 Governor's Influence -6.213 5.630 5.724 -1.085   
     Legislature's Influence 
    
  0.680 3.169 0.089 7.635 *** 
Budget per Member 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.790   0.000 0.000 2.735 0.000 
 Staff per Member -1.513 2.426 3.800 -0.398   2.735 2.426 0.701 3.902 *** 
Regulations Exist for Legislature -0.054 0.097 0.115 -0.468   0.067 0.097 17.254 0.004 
 Fulltime Commission 11.971 4.920 5.001 2.394 * 17.254 4.920 32.289 0.534 
 % Dem or Strong Dem -15.975 28.630 35.980 -0.444   32.289 28.630 16.776 1.925 . 
Spatial Factor -5.022 21.930 24.763 -0.203   16.776 21.930 24.481 0.685   
           t-levels: *1.960 (0.05); **2.576 (0.01); ***3.291(0.001) 
           R Sq 0.319 0.364 
Adj R Sq 0.194 0.273 
F 2.007 on 7 and 38 degrees of freedom 2.453 on 7 and 38 degrees of freedom 
RESET 0.033, p=0.967 0.146, p=0.864 
Breusch-Pagan 8.163, p=0.318 10.339, p=0.170 
           While the governor does not use his/her influence to affect oversight of the legislature, it appears that the legislature uses their 
authority to their own ends, decreasing the effectiveness of monitoring via their appointment authority.  Note that t-values 















Figure 4.2. Effectiveness of Regulations over Legislature | Legislature’s Influence 
 
Findings for Oversight of the Governor 
 Table 4.2 shows the results from models testing the effects of political 
influence on the effectiveness of regulations overseeing the governor.  For every 
one unit increase in the governor’s perceived political influence over the 
commission, there was 7.576 unit increase in the respondent’s agreement that 
oversight of executive branch conflicts of interest are effective.  Note however 





supports the scrutiny evasion hypothesis; this is partly to be expected though.  
As Krause and Woods (2012) note the relationship between the legislature and 
executive, while potentially adversarial, is one where the legislature uses its 
capacity to affect its preferred position.  Of course they also note, when the 
legislature has other means of achieving their preferred position, they tend to use 
that method rather than overtly exerting their influence.  The legislature may not 
use their political influence to increase the effectiveness of commission oversight 
of the executive simply because they do not need to do so.  Legislatures have 
more means of ensuring oversight of the executive than just influencing 
decisions over the ethics commission.  In any case, an overt attempt by a 
legislator to use their influence over the commission to go after a governor may 
backfire and be seen as overtly playing politics with a symbol of integrity (Smith 
2011).   
 These findings provide some additional nuance to findings from 
Rosenson (2003 and 2009).  She found that legislators were more likely to pass 
laws checking the executive than checking themselves.  On average respondents 
perceived the regulations overseeing the executive as more effective than those 
regulating the legislature.  Rosenson’s (2003) question was one of the practices of 
the legislature regarding the types of laws they pass.  In contrast, my findings 





will use that influence to weaken the regulations put on him/her by the 
legislature.   
 An interesting finding is that having a fulltime commission contributes 
significantly to the effectiveness of oversight regardless of whether the 
commission oversees the legislature or executive.  This supports the notion that 
more professional commissions tend to be more insulated than commissions that 
simply exist as sub-legislative or sub-executive entities.  While there is a broad 
body of literature on the ability of the political branches to influence the 
bureaucracy, it appears that this influence is likely more prevalent in 
commissions that exist as subsidiaries of the executive or legislative branch as 
opposed to those that exist as separate agencies.  One potential reason was noted 
by both Rosenson (2006) and Mackenzie (2002).  Ethics policies tend not to reflect 
the true priorities of policymakers.  This is because ethics policy targets the 
policymakers as opposed to other policies such education policy or insurance 
policy which target outside entities.  Although not tested here, it would make 
sense that fulltime, professional commissions would be more insulated from ex 
ante or ex post retaliation than members of commissions that are simply a flow 







Findings for Oversight of the Legislature 
Looking at table 4.3 one can see that the influence of the legislature is 
positively associated with the perceived effectiveness of monitoring the 
legislature.  This is consistent with the idea that legislators use the commission 
not to check the executive but as a tool against political rivals.  Although 
individual legislators as targets were not examined here, the target of monitoring 
was the legislature.  Additionally there is no effect from the governor’s influence.  
This implies that when it comes to the legislature, there is neither an inter-branch 
adversarial relationship, nor an institutional desire to evade scrutiny – rather it 
proposes that the desire is to harm opponents as opposed to protecting the 
institution.  The evidence then supports the idea that legislators do not utilize 
institutional capacity as the legislature but act as individual legislators.   I should 
note that the total change in the perceived effectiveness of regulations for the 
legislature is lower than the total change in the regulations overseeing the 
executive.  This is simply because regulations overseeing the legislature are seen 
as being less effective in general.  It is not the case though that the regulations 
overseeing the legislature are seen as more effective than those overseeing the 
executive.  As such my findings do not imply that legislative controls engenders 
more perceived effectiveness, merely that the corresponding change from 





Evidence supporting the Witch Hunt hypothesis within the legislature is 
supported by another finding in Model 4.  When it comes to the effectiveness of 
regulations over the legislature, staff size matters.  This makes sense though if 
the legislature is using the commission as a means of going after rivals, e.g. as the 
proportion of staffing to monitoring increases, then effectiveness should also 
increase.   
Findings for Controls 
Lastly, this point about evading scrutiny coupled with discussions of the 
governor as a figurehead gets back to well-worn arguments about the role of 
information and citizen’s knowledge of politics.  Obviously the average citizen is 
not checking the ethics commission website on a daily basis to see who got fined, 
where ethics trainings are taking place, or who is under investigation.  They rely 
on the media to break stories of political corruption for them.  But that 
understanding then questions the role and even the value of ethics commissions 
in all of this.  Does this mean then that ethics commissions are only minor actors 
in exposing political scandals and the real exposure comes from robust media 
coverage?  Given the evidence here I would think the answer is, “No.”     
My reason for this is that the spatial component was not significant.  
Campante and Do (2013) previously demonstrated that proximity of population 





because of the increased market for stories on politics.  This does not mean 
though that more media coverage is inherent in more effective commissions.  
Now it may be that commissions do not need to do as thorough an investigation 
in a robust media market as they would in a weak media market – they may 
simply plant the seed with an initial inquiry and let the journalists do the rest.  
But this would mean that the commission’s effectiveness would be confounded 
by media coverage which is partly what is seen here.  The absence of an effect is 
obviously difficult to interpret with any significant meaning, but given previous 
findings around population centers and journalists, I think the connection 
between media and societal trust in institutions is still an idea that merits further 
exploration. 
Potential Criticisms and Improvements 
One point to note, and a potential criticism, is that from the above one 
could ask whether exposing scandals is akin to effectiveness as opposed to the 
idea that an effective ethics commission promotes ethical behavior (see e.g. 
Garafolo and Guerass 2002 and Denhardt 1988).  This is a potential criticism of 
my analysis given that the respondents were journalists who may see more value 
in exposing misdeeds rather than in ensuring that they do not occur.  While 
reporters as respondents are more informed than the general public, one cannot 





towards exposure than education.  I would note though that if this were strictly 
the case then variable for the spatial distribution of populations around state 
capitals should have been significant and positive.  As noted in Campante and 
Do (2013) larger population centers closer to government centers means that the 
market for news is more geared to stories about politics (Campante and Do 2013; 
Kenski, Hardy and Jamieson 2010).  Although one may think that this makes the 
reporting of scandals more likely as the population around state capitals 
increases, Campante and Do (2013) found the opposite to be true.  More secluded 
state capitals tend to be more associated with corruption because, according to 
Campante and Do, elected officials have less concern that they will be exposed 
given that the media market is less geared towards politics.  Given the lack of 
effect in my model then, one cannot conclude that reporters’ responses are 
rooted in a desire to sell more stories.   
Discussion 
What does all of this say about the effects of political influence over ethics 
commissions and in turn the effectiveness of ethics commissions?  First, it 
appears that governors use their influence over ethics commissions as a means of 
evading scrutiny.  This is supported by the negative relationship between 
perceived effectiveness overseeing the executive and political influence from the 





to be using his/her influence over the commission.  I can make this claim because 
influence was measured as a function of appointment authority.  Additionally, 
the fact that increases in the governor’s removal power are also associated with 
decreases in perceived effectiveness means that the respondents perceive the 
governor’s ability to remove, or threat to remove as a means through which the 
governor can control the commission’s oversight of his office. 
In this manuscript I have examined the correlates of perceived 
effectiveness of regulations over the governor and over the legislature.  My 
analysis also supplements portions of the state politics literature which 
examining legislative-executive relations.  I find relatively strong evidence that 
the governor seeks to behave as a principal and treat the commissioners as 
agents.  My findings for the legislature reinforce the idea that legislators delegate 
authority based upon their own political desires as opposed to the institution’s 
capacity. 
The cross-state variation that I use in this manuscript provides good 
complement to previous works addressing both ethics enforcement (Rosenson 
2003; 2005; 2009; Smith 2003 ab; 2011; Lewis and Gilman 2012) as well as to 
works on legislative-executive interaction (Krause and Woods 2012; McGrath 
2012).  The small sample size makes identifying the determinants of perceived 





over ethics commission activities.  The fact that my findings diverge from 
expectations about legislative-executive interactions in the bureaucracy supports 
my initial proposition that ethics commissions are unique as bureaucratic 
institutions. 
My results are largely consistent with the ideas put forth by Rosenson 
(2003), but extend her ideas into the functioning of commissions rather than just 
their formation.  Low perceptions of effectiveness in the presence of increased 
political control are a sign of a weak institution.  Although perceptions of 
reporters per se do not provide a direct measure of commission activity, these 
results do indicate that increased political influence located in a single individual 
decreases the capacity of the commission to engage the governor as a neutral 
actor.   
These findings also lend credence to the idea that because influence is 
diffuse in the legislature a principal-agent model is not sufficient.  Moreover a 
rational organizational model does not work either.  Even though institutional 
rationality would dictate that elected officials limit commissions through 
oversight powers, individual political desires may influence individual 
legislatures to use the commission against their rivals.  Note that this is not tested 





 Finally, my analysis adds useful insights into how ethics commissions as 
institutions may be designed to more effectively oversee elected officials.  My 
results reinforce the idea that concentrated political influence is detrimental for 
effective monitoring.  As such one suggestion would be to increase the number 
of individuals with appointment authority to a commission.  Glaeser and Saks 
(2002) show that politicians should be concerned about corruption because it is 
detrimental to investment in their states.  As such the fact that legislators appear 
to be behaving in a manner that is not institutionally rational may be a good 
thing because it appears that corruption gets exposed to a greater degree.  
However given that perceived effectiveness was generally lower in the 
legislature it also appears that the respondents realize that legislators are acting 
as self-interested individuals and not actually seeking out corruption for the sake 








Chapter Five: Closing and Next Questions 
My goal in this dissertation was to examine if and how political officials 
influence ethics commissions as institutions.  My study has revealed some 
interesting findings.  A key finding suggested by my research is that although 
the legislative and executive branches both seek to influence ethics commissions 
by controlling who sits on the commission, they do so with different goals in 
mind.  In addition, my results suggest that questions of staffing capacity and 
budget capacity are only weakly associated with the perceived effectiveness of 
commissions at monitoring elected officials’ conflicts of interest.    
  However this study has also raised some additional questions.  For 
example, what are the prospects for reforming commissions to achieve their 
stated ideals: can structural changes to the institutions have any real impact on 
the commissions, or are the interests of elected officials so entrenched that 
substantive reforms are impossible?  Finally, what does this say about the value 
of ethics commissions? Can their decisions be considered legitimate given the 
impacts of political influence on their perceived effectiveness; or are merely 





politics of ethics commissions, which includes a discussion of how a public 
desire for signals of integrity (Smith 2011) has promoted commissions as 
symbolic institutions. 
Utilizing Commissions 
A natural question in the discussion of political influence over ethics 
commissions is whether commissioners have enough discretion to act on the 
presumed goals of elected officials, i.e. to articulate ethics regulations?  The 
average citizen may take for granted that commissioners have discretion over 
who/what to investigate.  This is not to say that they have no discretion, rather 
that they have less than the public believes and they may be loath to use what 
little discretion they have given the recourse available to elected officials.  In the 
traditional administrative discretion literature there are concerns about whether 
discretion is fully utilized by administrators, e.g. Peters (1996), Peters and Pierre 
(1998), and Sowa and Selden (2003) argue that administrators may in fact have 
limited discretion given the number of actors they must satisfy.  However as 
Peters (1996) and Coggburn et al (2010) note the rules of an institution offer a 
sense of security and in turn they offer a veil behind which members of that 
institution may hide in justifying their decisions.  This is important in the 
discussion of my findings since the rules of commissions as political institutions 





regulate them.  This turns the old saying qui custodiet ipsos custodes (who watches 
the watchmen) on its head.   
Rosenson (2003) demonstrated that commissions are established when 
the new institution is not seen as a threat.   I have demonstrated that elected 
officials use their influence over commissions to different self-serving ends.  Yet 
to be discussed are the regulations empowering commissions.  It makes sense 
though that – given Rosenson’s findings and my own – the rules governing a 
commission would also be designed to facilitate the types of decisions that allow 
commissioners some cover for their decisions to investigate or not investigate 
particular individuals.  However one could also make the case that it really may 
not matter what types of rules are in place if political influence is the 
determining factor. 
One can gain insight into this by examining the existence of rules 
regarding the independence of commissions and comparing them to the 
perceived independence of commissions.  Several of the questions on the 2011 
State Integrity Investigation (SII) address whether or not in law, commissions 
are empowered with the authority to (1) independently investigate alleged 
violations of state ethics; and (2) independently impose penalties on individuals 
found guilty of state ethics rules.  Every state that has an ethics commission, 





knowing that respondents answered affirmatively to both questions in all but 
one case but also knowing that there is wide variation in the perceived 
independence of the commission we can say that simply having rules 
empowering the commission to take action does not mean that the commission 
will take action. 
Such insights mean that any concerns over commissions not being 
empowered to take action are likely overstated.  However it still leaves opens at 
least two questions around determining compliance with ethics regulations.  
First, empowering regulations determine the processes a commission must 
follow in adjudicating questions of compliance.  Second, empowering 
regulations also set boundaries for an institution and so this raises the question 
of what a commission requires of the subjects of ethics regulations, e.g. the 
stringency with which regulations are enforced.  Compliant processes while 
likely different from state-to-state may not matter if the effectiveness of 
commissions is a function of how elected officials can shape commissions to 
maintain influence over them.  This is because political influence can be a factor 
in either increasing regulations around the commission, or deregulating the 
commission; in either case political influence is being manifested over a body 





Even though commissions have the legal capacity to act independently 
they are still not free from political influence.  Therefore if one changes the 
number of rules that empower a commission, this will not change the fact that 
they are still first subject to political influence.  In fact decreasing the rules to 
which commissioners are subject could exacerbate the problem.  The reason for 
this is that as noted by Peters (1996) and Coggburn et al (2010) rules can provide 
potential cover.  Elected officials will not likely ask a commissioner to allow 
them to violate a regulation, the risk is simply too great for such overt action – a 
similar argument to Laffont and Tirole (1991) as to why firms do not simply 
bribe regulators.  However if a commissioner assumes ex post consequences, or 
ex ante, feels that they owe an elected official, they may more inclined look the 
other way. 
Commissions and the Importance of Symbols 
Americans have a strong sense of distrust and cynicism towards 
government (Dubnick 1994; Kellough 1998).  Such observations are important in 
discussing ethics commissions because one of the goals of commissions is to 
provide a signal of accountability (Smith 2003ab; 2011).  Commissions were born 
of scandal and are direct effort to address the trust deficit between the public 
and elected officials.  Given my findings though, it appears that commissions 





symbolic purpose, i.e. they serve as a signal of integrity (Smith 2003).  If 
commission activities are directed towards one’s political rivals, or simply away 
from oneself base on political influence then the accountability provided is not 
meaningful in the sense of real oversight.  Rather it is simply a recognition that 
exposure by the commission is bad electorally and therefore it can be useful to 
expose one’s rivals and harmful to have one's self exposed.   
The public may be none the wiser as to how influence is being wielded 
over a commission and moreover they simply may not care.  It is well known 
that the public’s knowledge of politics is severely lacking (Carpini, Jacobs and 
Cook 2009; Franklin 2002; Campell 1960).  The average citizen cannot identify 
their own congressional representative (Popkin and Dimock 2009) let alone 
recognize how political influence is wielded over the state ethics commission.  
Even when the political maneuverings over the ethics commission are made 
public, there may be no long term effects.  For example after revelations of SC 
Governor Nikki Haley’s influencing the SC Ethics Commission her approval 
among the general public dropped below 50% to 41% (Cohen, 2013).  However 
among likely Republican voters her approval ratings remained high at 78% 
(Huffmon 2014).   
Notwithstanding a few instances of strong ethical oversight, e.g. 





Perry (R-TX) being indicted for attempting to defund the Texas commission in 
response to an investigation, the overall picture for commissions is not a pretty 
one.  Although states have taken steps to increase the strength of their 
regulations around ethics and accountability in light of the embarrassing 
findings of the State Integrity Investigation, many of these proposals have been 
feckless or have died in committee.  As discussed above though, even if 
regulations had been passed it is not clear that much would really change given 
the power of political influence over a commission.  In short, given the political 
influence to which commissions are subject, and the fact that the public seeks 
assurances of integrity via the commission but does not recognize the political 
influence to which the commissions are subject, commissions may be nothing 
more than symbolic institutions. 
Symbols have value to the degree that they are not explained (Campbell 
1993).  Indeed Edelman (1985: 56) argues that administrative agencies serve an 
“expressive function” and provide a sense of legitimacy to the issues they were 
designed to address.  Ethics commissions are designed to address issues of 
ethical oversight.  The point is that ethics commissions could provide symbolic 







It is often said that good investigations raise as many questions as they 
answer (Light and Pillemer 2009).  Hopefully my analysis here has done just 
that.  I have provided the first analysis of political influence over the functions 
of ethics commissions.  This addresses a gap in the literature since most studies 
to date have addressed the correlates for the creation of commissions, or the 
internal workings of commissions (Rosenson 2003; 2005; 2009; Lewis and 
Gilman 2012; Smith 2003 ab).   
While my research has addressed some significant unanswered questions 
in the study of ethics commissions, significant questions remain.  For example, 
to those who claim that legislators do not act against their own self-interest in 
empowering commissions (Rosenson 2003), my results imply that such 
calculations may be true for their creation but generalizing this to active 
commission ignores the issue that legislators appear to use commissions to 
expose political rivals.  Others may be curious about how to design more 
effective commissions and avoid the problems of political influence.  There do 
not appear to be inter-branch adversarial arrangements, but they were not 
tested in isolation specifically because such exclusive arrangements do not exist.  
My model points to a solution of commissions with quasi-judicial authority 





tenure.  Finally, additional research is needed to determine if socio-cultural 
factors and what causal mechanisms (scandals and the like) are associated with 
different types of commission designs. 
These are just a few possibilities of future research.  Readers will of 
course have their own ideas and their own criticisms for what questions warrant 
future investigation.  Additionally no piece of research is perfect.  One admitted 
weakness of this dissertation is in the availability of data.  Relying on the State 
Integrity Investigation is nice because the methodology for recording and 
measuring responses was thorough.  In the end though the survey only records 
single observations for each state.  The bootstrapping required in my models 
accounted for some of this but no statistical technique should be preferred to 
additional data.  Whatever the agenda topic though, there is a healthy research 
agenda for the determinants of ethics commission activity as well as what is 
perceived as ethical political behavior across the states.  With an ever increasing 
skepticism as to the motivation of politicians, a recognition by elected officials 
that commissions and can affect their political fortunes, and what their actions 
in this regard say about the legitimacy of oversight; it is imperative to continue 
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Appendix A: Partial Proportional Odds Model 
The ordered logistic regression assumes proportional odds, i.e. that the slopes, 
while nonlinear, are at least parallel.  Often this assumption is violated, but the 
ordered logistic regression is used nonetheless.  To test the parallel lines 
assumption one can rely on the Brant test, which is a likelihood ratio test 
between a standard ordered logit and the ordered logit with the dependent 
variables allowed to vary across categories (in seeming violation of the 
assumption of parallel lines) – see also Peterson and Harrell (1980).  If the 
second model has a significant chi-square value as compared to the original 
model then the parallel lines assumption is violated and an ordered logit is not 
to be preferred.  For technical specification see the demonstration below: 
The partial proportional odds model can be written as  
()* ? @.  ABCDEF 
exp )JE K CDE.
1 K LexpBJE K CDEFM
, @  1,2, … , O P 1 
Where M –s the number of categories of an ordinal dependent variable.  So the 
probability of Y will take on each of the values 1,…,M equals  
()*  1.  1 P A)CD+. 





()*  O.  1 P A)CD;,+. 
Wolfe and Gould (1998) show that the ordered logit is actually a special case of 
the partial proportional odds model.  The formulas are the same, save the fact 
that the ordered logit all of the DQ are the same for each value of @ but not the 
JR (Williams 2006), e.g.  
()* ? @.  A)CD. 
exp )JE K CD.
1 K LexpBJE K CDFM
, @  1,2, … , O P 1 
The partial proportional odds model allows for the DQ to be the same or 
different for each category.  Note that this could not be accomplished by other 
models such as a multinomial logit.  This is because the  multinomial logit will 
generate many more parameters because the multinomial logit frees all 
variables, when in fact the parallel lines assumption may only be violated by a 
few of the variables.  The partial proportional odds model cleans this up by 
relaxing the assumption of proportional odds only for those variables where the 









Appendix B: Robustness Checks for Models in Chapter Three 
Table B.1. Robustness checks using models with only Budget per Issue and only Staff per Issue 
  MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
  β boot σ z sig β boot σ z sig β boot σ z sig 
(Intercept):1 2.585 0.786 3.287 ** 2.955 0.764 3.870 *** 4.420 0.681 6.488 *** 
(Intercept):2 1.598 0.781 2.046 * 1.973 0.759 2.598 ** 3.445 0.674 5.109 *** 
(Intercept):3 0.372 0.776 0.479   0.746 0.756 0.987   2.197 0.668 3.289 ** 
(Intercept):4 -1.509 0.774 -1.949   -1.136 0.753 -1.508   0.354 0.664 0.533 
Budget per Issue 1.379 0.280 4.931 *** 1.167 0.265 4.396 ***   
Staff per Issue Handled 0.108 0.053 2.031 **   0.205 0.051 4.048 *** 
Legislature's Appointment Authority -4.209 0.411 -10.238 *** -4.199 0.408 -10.292 *** -3.764 0.406 -9.260 *** 
Governor's Appointment Authority -1.955 0.302 -6.480 *** -1.900 0.301 -6.313 *** -1.631 0.297 -5.487 *** 
Removal Power -0.257 0.051 -5.015 *** -0.249 0.050 -4.929 *** -0.284 0.051 -5.566 *** 
Independence of Budget 0.191 0.182 1.047   0.340 0.156 2.181 ** 0.091 0.182 0.499 
Economic Interests 0.400 0.132 3.030 ** 0.492 0.128 3.834 *** 0.331 0.131 2.519 ** 
Average State Income 0.000 0.000 -3.250 ** 0.000 0.000 -2.886 ** 0.000 0.000 -4.168 *** 
% Dem or Strong Dem 3.062 0.940 3.257 ** 2.461 0.877 2.805 ** 3.240 0.939 3.449 ** 
Legislature is Monitored x Leg Appointment        
Legislature is Monitored x Gov Appointment        
Legislature is Monitored       
Issues Alone                         
Z Levels: *1.960 (0.05); **2.576 (0.01); ***3.291(0.001) 
        





AIC 154.712 152.876 153.784 
BIC 178.484 174.819 175.728 
Log-likelihood -64.356 -64.438 -64.892 
LR test versus Saturated Model 3.382 7.541 6.632 
DF 171 172 172 
Model 3 is the full model from the text. Model 4 shows that the coefficients do not change significantly when Staff per Issue is removed, likewise 
Model 5 shows that the coefficient do not change significantly when Budget per Issue is removed. This indicates that Model 3 is robust to these 
changes and the fact that Staff per Issue is significant in Model 3 but not Model 2 is a function of the functional form of Financial Capacity and that 





Table B.2. Robustness Checks using full model with interaction terms and model w/o Budget or Staff variables 
   MODEL 6 MODEL 7 
  β boot σ z sig β boot σ z sig 
(Intercept):1 0.223 0.823 0.271   3.523 0.775 4.548 *** 
(Intercept):2 -0.925 0.820 -1.127   2.549 0.769 3.314 *** 
(Intercept):3 -2.318 0.820 -2.828 ** 1.316 0.764 1.723 
(Intercept):4 -4.327 0.823 -5.259 *** -0.543 0.759 -0.715 
Budget per Issue 1.224 0.284 4.316 *** 
Staff per Issue Handled -0.126 0.065 -1.949   
Legislature's Appointment Authority -1.974 0.637 -3.101 ** -3.948 0.405 -9.743 *** 
Governor's Appointment Authority 1.470 0.514 2.856 ** -1.762 0.301 -5.850 *** 
Removal Power -0.074 0.056 -1.324   -0.266 0.050 -5.294 *** 
Independence of Budget 0.751 0.203 3.699 *** 0.221 0.155 1.426 
Economic Interests 0.664 0.139 4.789 *** 0.388 0.126 3.076 ** 
Average State Income 0.000 0.000 -2.750 ** 0.000 0.000 -3.533 *** 
% Dem or Strong Dem 1.729 1.033 1.674   3.013 0.872 3.456 *** 
Legislature is Monitored x Leg Appointment  -2.384 0.929 -2.565 ** 
Legislature is Monitored x Gov Appointment  -3.991 0.668 -5.975 *** 
Legislature is Monitored 3.653 0.309 11.821 *** 
Issues Alone         0.107 0.045 2.391 * 
Z Levels: *1.960 (0.05); **2.576 (0.01); ***3.291(0.001)         
            
Residual deviance 122.798 129.526 
AIC 154.798 153.526 
BIC 184.056 175.471 
Log-likelihood -61.399 -64.673 
LR test versus Saturated Model 13.618 6.891 
DF 168 172 
Model 6 shows the coefficients when adding the interaction terms for monitoring the legislature and Model 7 shows the coefficients when only 







APPENDIX C: Robustness Checks for Models in Chapter Four 
Table C.1. Robustness Checks for Legislative Effectiveness Model 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
  β (σ) β (σ) β (σ) β (σ) 
(Intercept) 4.522 9.220 9.765 11.186 
  (18.190) (32.290) (17.605) (19.629) 
Legislature's Influence 6.995 6.126 8.037 9.299 
  (13.100) (13.530) (12.738) (12.743) 
Governor's Influence 3.253 2.341 5.640 7.251 
  (9.178) (9.637) (9.391) (9.232) 
Budget per Member 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Budget per Issue -8.707 -7.711 
  (8.278) (9.288) 
Staff per Member 1.905 2.090 2.040 
  (2.541) (2.617) (2.442) 
Staff per Issue 0.517 
  (0.749) 
Regs Exist 0.056 0.054 0.090 0.108 
  (0.100) (0.104) (0.102) (0.100) 
Fulltime Commission 17.140 16.520 15.233 15.064 
  (5.142) (5.373) (5.303) (5.720) 
% Dem of Strong Dem 20.080 24.520 21.473 16.322 
  (29.000) (36.970) (28.281) (28.014) 
Spatial Factor 20.500 25.760 21.583 21.966 
  (22.390) (26.570) (22.027) (22.207) 
% >25 w/College + -30.050 
  (50.210) 
Religiosity 0.015 
  (31.370) 
 
 
R Squared 0.326 0.333 0.335 0.329 
Adjusted R Squared 0.179 0.142 0.201 0.177 
AIC 374.933 379.567 376.267 375.617 
 
Note the model in the text includes boostrapped standard errors. Because my 
concern here is with the coefficients I did not bootstratp the standard errors.  
The results show that my model is robust to the addition of other variables and 





better leverage than alternatives. 
 
Table C.2. Robustness Checks for Gubernatorial Effectiveness Model 
  MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 MODEL 8 
  β (σ) β (σ) β (σ) β (σ) 
(Intercept) 60.520 59.241 6.130 63.742 
  (21.190) (20.822) (33.990) (22.974) 
Legislature's Influence -28.030 -24.558 -31.590 -26.189 
  (14.390) (14.198) (13.880) (14.143) 
Governor's Influence -14.890 -12.804 -11.590 -14.312 
  (10.040) (10.353) (9.924) (10.160) 
Budget per Member 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Budget per Issue -5.047 -8.999 
  (6.404) (7.874) 
Staff per Member -2.398 -2.822 -2.520 
  (2.780) (2.700) (2.701) 
Staff per Issue -1.671 
  (1.829) 
Regs Exist 0.402 0.408 0.350 0.383 
  (0.140) (0.142) (0.143) (0.140) 
Fulltime Commission 10.870 10.280 9.089 11.533 
  (5.560) (5.756) (5.461) (6.177) 
% Dem of Strong Dem -44.900 -38.680 -19.720 -36.377 
  (31.520) (31.380) (27.860) (31.149) 
Spatial Factor 5.756 3.964 5.444 3.474 
  (24.780) (24.656) (37.470) (24.746) 
% >25 w/College + 13.200 
  (53.590) 
Religiosity 73.440 
  (32.020) 
R Squared 0.336 0.335 0.424 0.331 
Adjusted R Squared 0.192 0.194 0.259 0.186 
AIC 384.587 384.628 384.032 384.938 
Note the model in the text includes boostrapped standard errors. Because my 
concern here is with the coefficients I did not bootstratp the standard errors.  
The results show that my model is robust to the addition of other variables and 
that the functional form of my budget and staffing measures provide slightly 









Appendix D: State Integrity Investigation Questionnaire 
Public Access to Information 
Do citizens have a legal right of access to information? 
In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic 
government records. 
In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is 
denied. 
In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can 
request government records. 
In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the application of access to 
information laws and regulations. 
Is the right of access to information effective? 
In practice, state agencies and government officials are not exempt from access to 
information laws. 
In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a 
reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable 
cost. 
In practice, responses to information requests are of high quality. 
In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a 
reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost. 
In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request. 
In practice, when necessary, the agency that monitors the application of access to 
information laws and regulations independently initiates investigations. 
In practice, when necessary, the agency that monitors the application of access to 
information laws and regulations imposes penalties on offenders. 
 Political Financing 
Are there regulations governing the financing of political parties? 
In law, there are limits on individual donations to political parties. 
In law, there are limits on corporate donations to political parties. 
In law, there are limits on donations from political action committees to political 
parties. 
In law, there are limits on lobbyists' donations to political parties. 






In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties by 
corporations. 
In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties by 
political action committees. 
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of 
political parties when financial irregularities are uncovered. 
In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of political parties. 
Are there regulations governing the financing of individual political candidates? 
In law, there are limits on individual donations to political candidates. 
In law, there are limits on corporate donations to individual political candidates. 
In law, there are limits on donations from political action committees to individual 
political candidates. 
In law, legislators are prohibited from the personal use of campaign contributions. 
In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political 
candidates. 
In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political 
candidates from corporations. 
In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political 
candidates from political action committees. 
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the campaign 
finances of individual political candidates when irregularities are uncovered. 
In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of individual political 
candidates' campaigns. 
In law, there are limits on lobbyists' donations to individual candidates. 
Are the regulations governing the political financing of parties effective? 
In practice, the limits on individual donations to political parties are effective in 
regulating an individual's ability to financially support a political party. 
In practice, the limits on corporate donations to political parties are effective in 
regulating a company's ability to financially support a political party. 
In practice, the limits on donations to political parties by political action committees 
are effective in regulating the organization's ability to financially support a political 
party. 
In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political 
parties independently initiates investigations. 
In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political 
parties imposes penalties on offenders. 
In practice, contributions to political parties are audited. 
In practice, individuals, corporations, or political action committees do not resort to 
"astroturfing" -- defined here as the financial support of a political party or 
individual using mechanisms designed to give the appearance of a grassroots 
movement -- to bypass limits on political financing. 
In practice, the limits on lobbyist donations to political parties are effective in 





Are the regulations governing the political financing of individual candidates 
effective? 
In practice, the limits on individual donations to political candidates are effective in 
regulating an individual's ability to financially support a particular candidate. 
In practice, the limits on corporate donations to individual candidates are effective 
in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate. 
In practice, the limits on political action committee donations to individual 
candidates are effective in regulating the political action committee's ability to 
financially support a candidate. 
In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of 
individual candidates' campaigns independently initiates investigations. 
In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of 
individual candidates' campaigns imposes penalties on offenders. 
In practice, the finances of individual candidates' campaigns are audited. 
In practice, the limits on lobbyists' donations to individual candidates are effective in 
regulating lobbyists' ability to financially support an individual candidate. 
Can citizens access records related to the financing of political parties? 
In practice, political parties disclose data relating to financial support and 
expenditures within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties within a 
reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties at a reasonable 
cost. 
In practice, the publicly available records of political parties' finances are of high 
quality. 
In practice, the publicly available records of political parties' finances are accessible 
to the public online in a meaningful and accessible manner. 
Can citizens access records related to the financing of individual candidates' 
campaigns? 
In practice, individual political candidates disclose data relating to financial support 
and expenditures within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their 
campaign revenues and expenditures) within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates at a 
reasonable cost. 
In practice, the publicly available records of political candidates' campaign finances 
are of high quality. 
In practice, the publicly available records of political candidates' finances are 
accessible to the public online in a meaningful and accessible manner. 
 Executive Accountability 
Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions? 





In law, the governor and/or state cabinet-level officials are prohibited from using 
state funds for personal purposes. 
In practice, the regulations preventing the governor and/or state cabinet-level 
officials from using state funds for personal purposes are effective. 
In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive. 
In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive. 
In practice, the governor limits the use of executive orders to establishing new 
regulations, policies, or government practices. 
Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings? 
In law, the governor can be prosecuted for crimes he/she commits. 
In law, state cabinet-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit. 
In practice, the governor is prosecuted for crimes she/he commits. 
In practice, state cabinet-level officials are prosecuted for crimes they commit. 
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch (defined 
here as governors and/or cabinet-level officials)? 
In law, the governor is required to file a regular asset disclosure form. 
In law, state cabinet-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form. 
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of 
the executive branch. 
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch 
asset disclosure forms (defined here as governors and/or cabinet-level officials). 
In law, the governor and/or state cabinet-level officials are prohibited from the 
personal use of campaign contributions. 
In law, there are restrictions on the governor and/or state cabinet-level officials 
setting up non-profit organizations (e.g. community groups, think tanks) that can be 
used to reward political supporters and/or evade campaign finance rules. 
In law, there are regulations for the disclosure of non-profit organizations (CSOs, 
think tanks, etc.) set up by the governor and/or state cabinet-level officials. 
In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism (favorable treatment of family 
members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage 
(favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) amongst members of the 
executive branch.  
In law, there are restrictions on governors and/or state cabinet-level officials entering 
the private sector after leaving the government. 
Are the regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch (defined 
here as governors and/or cabinet-level officials) effective? 
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment 
for governors and/or state cabinet-level officials are effective. 
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the 
executive branch are effective. 
In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as governors and/or 
cabinet-level officials) are audited. 





officials from using campaign contributions for personal purposes are effective. 
In practice, executive branch actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on 
nepotism, cronyism, or patronage. 
Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the governor and the state 
cabinet? 
In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the governor and/or state 
cabinet-level officials. 
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the governor and/or 
state cabinet-level officials within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the governor and/or 
state cabinet-level officials at a reasonable cost. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of the governor and/or state cabinet-level 
officials are of high quality. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the governor and/or state 
cabinet-level officials are accessible to the public online in a meaningful and 
accessible manner. 
In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the 
functions of the ruling political party. 
 Legislative Accountability 
Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions? 
In law, legislators are prohibited from the personal use of public funds. 
In practice, the regulations preventing legislators from using public funds for 
personal purposes are effective. 
In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature. 
In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature. 
In law, are members of the state legislature subject to criminal proceedings? 
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the state 
legislature? 
In law, members of the state legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form. 
In law, there are restrictions for state legislators entering the private sector after 
leaving the government. 
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of 
the state legislature. 
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure 
forms of members of the state legislature. 
Are regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the state legislature 
effective? 
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment 
for state legislators are effective. 
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to state legislators 
are effective. 





In law, there are restrictions on legislators setting up non-profit organizations (e.g. 
community groups, think tanks) that can be used to reward political supporters 
and/or evade campaign finance rules. 
In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism (favorable treatment of family 
members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage 
(favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) in the hiring of legislative 
staff.  
In practice, legislative branch actions related to the hiring, firing, and promotion of 
legislative staff are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage. 
Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the state legislature? 
In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the state 
legislature. 
In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a 
reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable 
cost. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the state legislature are of 
high quality. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the state legislature are 
accessible to the public online in a meaningful and accessible manner. 
Can citizens access legislative processes and documents? 
In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.  
In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents -- 
defined as summaries of legislative proposals, debates, votes, and official actions -- 
within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents -- 
defined as summaries of legislative proposals, debates, votes, and official actions -- 
at a reasonable cost. 
In practice, the records of legislative processes and documents are accessible to the 
public online in a meaningful and accessible manner. 
In practice, the legislative process is sufficiently transparent to allow citizens/ CSOs 
to monitor the legislative process and provide input or changes to bills. 
 Judicial Accountability 
Is the process for selecting state-level judges transparent and accountable? 
In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting state-level judges. State-level 
judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a state law or 
constitution; are nominated/appointed by a state governmental body (state 
legislature or executive); and/or are elected state-wide. 
In practice, professional criteria are followed in selecting state-level judges. 
In law, there is a confirmation process for state-level judges (i.e. conducted by the 
legislature or an independent body). 





In law, judges are prohibited from the personal use of campaign contributions. 
In practice, the regulations preventing judges from using campaign contributions for 
personal purposes are effective. 
In law, judges are prohibited from the personal use of state funds. 
In practice, the regulations preventing judges from using state funds for personal 
purposes are effective. 
In law, members of the state-level judiciary are required to give reasons for their 
decisions. 
In practice, members of the state-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions. 
In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the state-level 
judicial system. 
In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from 
political interference. 
In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent 
mechanism) initiates investigations. 
In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent 
mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders. 
In law, there is a process in place to evaluate the performance of judges who are up 
for retention or reelection. 
In law, citizens can access the performance evaluations of judges who are up for 
retention or reelection. 
In practice, judges' performance evaluations are made available for the public to 
review. 
In law, citizens can access court administrative records. 
In practice, court decisions and opinions are made readily available to the public. 
In practice, court decisions and opinions are accessible to the public online in a 
meaningful and accessible manner. 
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the state-level judiciary? 
In law, members of the state-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure 
form. 
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of 
the state-level judiciary. 
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure 
forms of members of the state-level judiciary. 
In law, there are restrictions for state-level judges entering the private sector after 
leaving the government. 
In law, there are requirements for state-level judges to recuse themselves from cases 
in which they may have a conflict of interest. 
Are the regulations governing conflicts of interest for the state-level judiciary 
effective? 
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment 
for state-level judges are effective. 





state-level judiciary are effective. 
In practice, state-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited. 
In practice, the requirements for state-level judges to recuse themselves from cases in 
which they may have a conflict of interest are effective.  
In law, there are restrictions on state judges setting up non-profit organizations (e.g. 
community groups and think tanks) that can be used to reward political supporters 
and/or evade campaign finance rules. 
In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism (favorable treatment of family 
members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), or patronage 
(favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) amongst members of the 
judicial branch.  
In practice, judicial branch actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on 
nepotism, cronyism, or patronage. 
Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the state-level 
judiciary? 
In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the state-level 
judiciary. 
In practice, citizens can access state-level judiciary members' asset disclosure records 
within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access state-level judiciary members' asset disclosure records 
at a reasonable cost. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of the state-level judiciary are of high 
quality. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of the state-level judiciary are accessible to 
the public online in a meaningful and accessible manner. 
 State Budget Processes 
Can the legislature provide input to the state budget? 
In law, the legislature can amend the budget. 
In practice, significant public expenditures (defined as any project costing more than 
1% of the total state budget) require legislative approval. 
In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and 
provide input or changes. 
Can citizens access the state budgetary process? 
In practice, the state budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the 
debating stage (i.e. before final approval). 
In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings. 
In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations. 
In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public 
funds. 
Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective? 
In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee. 





opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion. 
In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into 
financial irregularities. 
Are budget information and related records made available to citizens? 
Does the state executive publish a pre-budget statement, which presents the 
assumptions used in developing the budget such as the expected revenue, 
expenditure, debt-levels, and broad allocations among sectors? 
Does the state executive publish its budget proposal, which presents the state 
government's detailed declaration of policies and priorities for the upcoming budget 
year? 
Does the state legislature publish an enacted budget document that authorizes the 
executive to implement the policy measures outlined in the budget? 
Does the state executive publish monthly or quarterly in-year reports on revenues 
collected, expenditures made, and debt incurred? 
Does the state executive publish a mid-year review for the first six months of the 
budget year to discuss any changes in economic assumptions that would affect 
approved budget policies? 
Does the state executive issue a year-end report summarizing the financial situation 
at the end of the fiscal year? 
Does the state publish an annual audit report, produced by an entity independent 
from the executive, which covers the activities undertaken by the executive during 
the fiscal year? 
Does the state publish a citizens budget containing non-technical budget 
information that is accessible to a broader audience? 
Do reports issued by the state contain information on tax expenditures (information 
on on tax credits, deductions, and exemptions that reduce state revenue)? 
Does the state have a well-resourced fiscal budget office for the non-partisan 
analysis of budget proposals? 
In law, there is a state fiscal budget office to provide fiscal notes and nonpartisan 
analysis on the costs and benefits of every bill and budget proposal. 
In practice, the state fiscal budget office has sufficient capacity to provide quality 
analysis in line with its mandate.  
 State Civil Service Management 
Are there regulations for the state civil service encompassing, at least, the 
managerial and professional staff? 
In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent, and fairly 
managed state civil service. 
In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism (favorable treatment of family 
members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), or patronage 
(favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) within the civil service. 
In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service. 






Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective? 
In practice, state civil servants are protected from political interference. 
In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional 
criteria. 
In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not 
based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage. 
In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions. 
In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay. 
In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service 
positions along with the number of positions actually filled. 
In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective. 
In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future 
government employment. 
Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants? 
In law, senior members of the state civil service are required to file an asset 
disclosure form. 
In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy 
decisions where their personal interests may be affected. 
In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after 
leaving the government. 
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants. 
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure 
forms of senior members of the state civil service. 
Are the regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants effective? 
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment 
for civil servants are effective. 
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants 
are effective. 
In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting 
personal interests are effective. 
In practice, civil service asset disclosures are audited. 
Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior state civil servants? 
In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior state civil servants. 
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior state civil 
servants within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior state civil 
servants at a reasonable cost. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of senior state civil servants are of high 
quality. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of senior state civil servants are accessible to 
the public online in a meaningful and accessible manner. 





when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)? 
In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse 
of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences. 
In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or 
abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences. 
In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local 
office) through which civil servants can report corruption. 
In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local 
office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective? 
In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a 
professional, full-time staff. 
In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives 
regular funding. 
In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on 
complaints within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector 
corruption initiates investigations. 
 Procurement 
Is the public procurement process effective? 
In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement 
officials. 
In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials. 
In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are 
enforced. 
In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes, and spending habits 
of public procurement officials. 
In law, major procurements require competitive bidding. 
In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of "sole sourcing." 
In law, rules exist to avoid "pay to play" conflicts in public procurement. 
In practice, "pay to play" rules are effectively enforced. 
In law, unsuccessful bidders can initiate an official review of procurement decisions. 
In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law. 
In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery) 
are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids. 
In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. 
bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids. 
In law, there are regulations governing the the conduct of state service contractors. 
In practice, the regulations governing the conduct of state service contractors are 
effective. 
Can citizens access the public procurement process? 
In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations. 






In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations (the rules governing 
the competitive procurement process) within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations (the rules governing 
the competitive procurement process) at a reasonable cost. 
In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised. 
In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids. 
In practice, the results of major procurement bids are accessible to the public online 
in a meaningful and accessible manner. 
 Internal Auditing 
Is there an audit institution or equivalent agency covering the entire state's public 
sector? 
In law, is there an audit institution, auditor general, or equivalent agency covering 
the entire state's public sector. 
Is the supreme audit institution effective? 
In law, the audit institution is protected from political interference. 
In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant 
justification. 
In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff. 
In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency. 
In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding. 
In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports. 
In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency. 
In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations. 
Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution? 
In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency. 
In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost. 
In practice, audit reports are accessible to the public online in a meaningful and 
accessible manner. 
 Lobbying Disclosure 
Is there a clear definition of a lobbyist in the state? 
In law, the definition of lobbyist recognizes executive branch lobbyists as well as 
legislative lobbyists. 
In law, lobbyists are defined on the basis of monetary thresholds specifying 
spending and/or compensation levels. 
In practice, the definition of a lobbyist tied to spending and/or compensation levels 
from lobbying activities effectively captures lobbyists' activity in the state.  
Are lobbyists required to register with the state? 
In law, lobbyists are required to file a registration form. 






In practice, lobbyists' registration information is comprehensive and of high quality. 
In law, lobbyists are required to file registrations annually. 
Are lobbyists required to disclose spending? 
In law, lobbyists are required to file a spending report.  
In practice, lobbyists' spending reports are filed with reasonable frequency.  
In law, lobbyists report compensation/salary on spending reports. 
In practice, the spending reports are comprehensive and of high quality. 
Are lobbyists' employers or principals required to disclose spending? 
In law, employers or principals of lobbyists are required to fill out spending reports. 
In practice, employers/principals list the compensation/salary of any lobbyists they 
hire on spending reports. 
Can citizens access the information reported from lobbyists to the state 
government? 
In practice, citizens can access lobbying disclosure documents (including 
registration, expenses, and compensation reports) within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, citizens can access lobbying disclosure documents at a reasonable cost.  
In practice, lobbying disclosure documents are accessible to the public online in a 
meaningful and accessible manner. 
Is there effective monitoring of lobbying disclosure requirements? 
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of lobbying disclosure 
records when irregularities are uncovered. 
In practice, the independent auditing of lobbying disclosure records is effective. 
In practice, when necessary, the state imposes penalties on offenders who violate 
lobbying disclosure and reporting requirements. 
 State Pension Fund Management 
Are there laws and regulations requiring that state-run pension funds be managed 
transparently? 
In law, there is an independent public redress mechanism for members of boards 
and management of the state-run pension funds. 
In law, state-run pension funds are required to publicly disclose information about 
their investment activities.  
In law, there are regulations governing the activity of placement agents, or hired 
third parties used by investment firms to secure business with state-run pension 
funds.  
In law, placement agents, or hired third parties used by investment firms to secure 
business with state-run pension funds, are required to disclose all fees and terms 
retained for providing “finder” or introduction services. 
In law, placement agents, or hired third parties used by investment firms to secure 
business with state-run pension funds, are required to register with the state. 






In practice, the state-run pension funds have sufficient staff and resources with 
which to fulfill their mandate. 
In practice, members of boards and management of the state-run pension funds are 
appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria. 
In practice, members of boards and management of the state-run pension funds are 
protected from political interference. 
In practice, the state-run pension funds disclose information about their investment 
and financial activity in a transparent manner. 
In practice, the investment decisions governing the portfolio of state-run pension 
funds are not concentrated in a single individual's hands. 
In practice, regulations governing the activity of placement agents, or hired third 
parties used by investment firms to secure business with state-run pension funds, 
are effective.  
In practice, private entities manage portions of state-run pension funds in a 
transparent manner. 
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest of members of the board or the 
management of the state run pension funds? 
In law, members of boards and management of the state run pension funds are 
required to file regular asset disclosure forms. 
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of 
boards and management of the state-run pension funds. 
In law, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of boards and 
management of the state-run pension funds. 
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure 
forms of members of boards and management of the state-run pension funds. 
In law, there are restrictions on members of boards and management of the state-run 
pension funds entering the private sector after leaving the office. 
In practice, regulations governing conflicts of interest of members of the board or 
the management of the state-run pension funds are effective? 
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of 
boards and management of the state-run pension funds are effective. 
In practice, asset disclosures of members of boards and management of the state-run 
pension funds are audited. 
In practice, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of boards 
and management of the state-run pension funds within a reasonable time period. 
In practice, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of boards 
and management of the state-run pension funds at a reasonable cost. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of boards and management of 
the state-run pension funds are accessible to the public online in a meaningful and 
accessible manner. 
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment 





 Ethics Enforcement Agencies 
Are there laws and regulations to promote and protect a professional ethics 
enforcement agency (or set of agencies)? 
In law, there is an agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules. 
In law, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules has an 
independently allocated budget for its activities. 
In law, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules can 
independently initiate investigations into alleged violations of state ethics 
rules/regulations. 
In law, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules can 
impose penalties on individuals found in violation of state ethics rules/regulations. 
In law, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules can 
propose the creation of relevant laws or regulations to bolster its mission. 
In law, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules has 
jurisdiction across all branches of the state government. 
Are the laws and regulations to promote and protect a professional ethics 
enforcement agency (or set of agencies) effective? 
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules has 
sufficient staff and resources. 
In practice, members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state 
ethics rules are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria. 
In practice, members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state 
ethics rules are protected from political interference. 
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules 
independently initiates investigations into alleged violations of state ethics 
rules/regulations. 
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules 
imposes penalties on offenders. 
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules 
proposes the creation of relevant laws or regulations to bolster its mission. 
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules 
monitors all branches of the state government in an effective manner. 
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules 
accepts all complaints brought before it. 
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules 
accepts complaints from anonymous complainants.   
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the ethics enforcement 
agencies? 
In law, members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics 
rules are required to file regular asset disclosure forms. 
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to the members 





In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure 
forms of members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics 
rules. 
Are the regulations governing conflicts of interest by the ethics enforcement agencies 
effective? 
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the 
agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules are effective. 
In practice, asset disclosures of members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with 
enforcing state ethics rules are audited. 
In law, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of the agency 
or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules. 
In practice, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of the 
agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules within a reasonable 
time period. 
In practice, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of the 
agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules at a reasonable cost. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the agency or set of agencies 
tasked with enforcing state ethics rules are accessible to the public online in a 
meaningful and accessible manner. 
In law, there are restrictions on members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with 
enforcing state ethics rules entering the private sector after leaving the office. 
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment 
for members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules 
are effective. 
 State Insurance Commissions 
Is the state insurance commission protected from political and special interest 
influence? 
In law, there are requirements for members of the board and senior staff of the state 
insurance commission to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their 
personal interests may be affected. 
In law, the members of the board and senior staff of the state insurance commission 
are protected from political interference. 
In practice, the the members of the board and senior staff of the state insurance 
commission are protected from political interference. 
In practice, the head of the members of the board and senior staff of the state 
insurance commission are protected from removal without relevant justification. 
Does the state insurance commission have sufficient capacity to carry out its 
mandate? 
In practice, the state insurance commission has a professional, full-time staff. 
In practice, the state insurance commission receives regular funding. 
Are there conflicts of interest regulations covering members of the board and senior 





In law, there are restrictions on the members of the board and senior staff of the state 
insurance commission entering the private sector after leaving the government. 
In law, members of the board and senior staff of the state insurance commission are 
required to file regular asset disclosure forms. 
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to the members 
of the board and senior staff of the state insurance commission. 
Are the conflicts of interest regulations covering members of the board and senior 
staff of the state insurance commission effective? 
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to the members of 
the board and senior staff of the state insurance commission are effective. 
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment 
for the members of the board and senior staff of the state insurance commission are 
effective. 
Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the state insurance commission? 
In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the the members of the 
board and senior staff of the state insurance commission 
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the the members of the 
board and senior staff of the state insurance commission within a reasonable time 
period. 
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the members of the 
board and senior staff of the state insurance commission at a reasonable cost. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of the members of the board and senior staff 
of the state insurance commission are of high quality. 
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the board and senior staff of 
the state insurance commission are accessible to the public online in a meaningful 
and accessible manner. 
In practice, asset disclosures for members of the state insurance commission are 
audited. 
Does the state insurance commission publicly disclose documents filed by insurance 
companies? 
In law, the state insurance commission is required to publicly disclose all documents 
filed by insurance companies with the agency. 
In practice, the state insurance commission publicly discloses all documents filed by 
insurance companies with the agency. 
In practice, the publicly available documents filed by insurance companies with the 
state insurance commission are accessible to the public online in a meaningful and 
accessible manner. 
In practice, meeting minutes and/or summaries of decisions made by the state 
insurance commission are publicly available. 
 Redistricting 
Is the state redistricting process open and transparent? 





on the redistricting process. 
In practice, for the latest redistricting round, public hearings were or are being held 
to solicit input on new district maps. 
In practice, for the latest redistricting round, schedules of these meeting and/or 
hearings were or are available to the public. 
In practice, for the latest redistricting round, the state government accepted or is 
accepting redistricting plans submitted by the public. 
In practice, for the latest redistricting round, the government made or is making a 
redistricting website or online source of redistricting information available to the 
public. 
 
                                                           
i The confidence gap represents a scenario where the public cannot distinguish between 
whether any public institutions are better, worse, or simply different than others. 
ii Proper names of commissions and empowering statutes are available at: 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/state-ethics-commissions.aspx 
iii Factor analysis using ordinal responses is fairly common practice, even though one 
of the assumptions of factor analysis is linearity in the parameters.  This was my 
reason for using the polychoric factor analysis as my means of testing for dimension 
reduction – an approach typically not used in the public administration literature. 
iv Note that the model using Budget per Monitored and Staff per Monitored provided 
lower AICs than the alternative models: 376.802 was the lowest AIC for the 
Governor’s model and 372.527 was the lowest AIC for the Legislature’s model. 
v The Michigan respondent answered affirmatively to question 1 but not question 2. 
Per the National Council of State Legislatures (2014), Michigan’s commission does 
not have the authority to levy sanctions. 
